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This thesis was an investigation into the historical 
significance and interpretation the Alaskan boundary dispute 
played in the tripartite relations of Canada, the United States, 
and Great Britain.
The first purpose of this work was to fully examine Hay- 
Herbert Treaty, emphasizing the hitherto unacknowledged benefits 
inherent in the treaty. The second purpose of this work was to 
reexamine Theodore Roosevelt's actions that have previously been 
the focal point of research in the Alaskan boundary dispute. The 
final purpose of this work was to explain the greater historical 
importance Canadians have maintained in the Alaskan boundary 
dispute and the affect of that greater relative significance. In 
more specific terms, the research showed the considerable study 
and emphasis the Alaskan boundary dispute received in Canadian 
historiography in opposition to the lack of research on this 
topic in the United States historiography.
The methodology of this thesis consisted of analyzing 
primary documents from diplomatic figures. Emphasis was given to 
the letters between Secretary of State John Hay, President 
Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Prime Minister Laurier, Clifford 
Shifton, Lord A1verstone, and Henry White. However, newspaper
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reports from toe United States, Canada, and Great Britain were 
also explored. Secondary works used included biographies of key 
figures and histories dealing with foreign relations between the 
countries. These latter sources were also engaged as primary 
sources when investigating the historiography.
UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
The Alaskan Boundary dispute involved contradictory 
interpretations of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825; a treaty 
which determined the boundary between the Alaskan Panhandle and 
Canada. The dispute was at its height during the period from 
1896 to 1903. In order to understand the Alaskan boundary 
dispute and its historiographical legacy, an understanding of the 
attitudes the Canadian people had of the United States during the 
dispute must first be discussed. Indeed, it will be argued that 
the legacy of the Alaskan boundary dispute can be viewed as a 
direct result of attitudes of the Canadian people before, during, 
and after the award.
The old maxim that history is written by the victors simply 
does not hold true in this case. The history of the Alaskan 
boundary dispute has been written almost exclusively by the 
losers in this case, Canadians. History is written by those 
individuals that find meaning and wish to place importance in the 
events of the past. Importance is the chief concern and Canadian 
+historians ascribed more importance to the Alaskan boundary 
dispute than their American counterparts.
A select group of Canadian historians found consequential
meaning in the Alaskan boundary dispute. This group was the so-
1
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called "independent nationalist" group of Canadian historians.
The importance of the Alaskan boundary dispute was its connection 
to Canadian nationalism. The development of Canadian autonomy 
was an evolutionary process opposed to the revolutionary process 
of American independence. Canada became gradually more 
autonomous from Great Britain over a long period of time. This 
slow development created innumerable opportunities for arguments 
to develop between Canada and Great Britain. Historians played a 
critical role in these arguments by interpreting events into pro­
autonomy and anti-autonomy categories.
Historians such as John Ewart and 0. D. Skelton, who 
favored a more autonomous Canada, became the principal historians 
of the Alaskan boundary dispute. Because these writers were 
promoting the development of a more autonomous Canadian 
government, the Alaskan boundary dispute was portrayed as an 
example of British Imperial neglect, if not treachery. Through 
this type of work, the dispute was given great significance in 
Canadian history; indeed, the Alaskan boundary dispute was 
interpreted as "one of the turning points of Canadian history."1
The positioning of the Alaskan boundary award as a result 
of British negligence was far less a matter of critical 
interpretation of facts than it was a continuation of the 
immediate reaction the Canadian people had towards the Alaskan 
boundary award. This immediate reaction was a product of their 
preconceived attitudes towards the United States and the actions
3of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal's two Canadian commissioners
(which will be covered in detail in course of this work).
The preconceived notions of the Canadian public were a
result of the uneasiness Canadians felt toward the United States.
This uneasiness was fostered by the long and often times troubled
history of Canadian-American relations. As former American
Secretary of State John W. Foster explained,
From the very beginning of our independence as a 
nation, our northern boundary line has been the source 
of almost constant discussion, and often of angry 
controversy, and more than once has brought the 
countries to the brink of war.2
Canada found this troublesome relationship even more
difficult, because it was the smaller and less powerful
nation.
Early twentieth century Canadians had learned through 
experience to be cautious of the expansionist United States. This 
apprehension was not without cause. Americans had attacked 
Canada in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. American 
based groups such as the Fenians had invaded Canada as late as 
the 1870's.a Prominent figures in United States government had 
talked of Canada being ceded as adjustment for the Alabama 
claims.b Along with many other incidents,0 there was considerable 
reason for Canada to be uneasy about the United States.
a The Fenians were an organisation that sought Independence for Ireland 
from Great Britain.
b The United States, in the Alabama cla as, charged that Great Britain 
was responsible for adding the Confede, ate states in the American Civil 
War.
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Not only was uneasiness towards the United States a notion 
of the Canadian public, it became a definition of Canadian 
nationalism. W. S. Wallace, the first editor of the Canadian 
Historical Review, "recognized that the [Canadian] sense of 
nationality rested on a geographical separateness, the rejection 
of the American Revolution, and the legacies of the War of 
1812. ”3 Canadians, or at least Canadian historians, defined 
themselves in opposition the United States.
Canada offers a unique arrangement in the conception of a 
Nation-State. The concept of a nation traditionally centers 
around considerations such as ethnic makeup, language, race, 
institutional differences, and geographical considerations. In 
relation to the United States and Canada, very few distinctions 
are apparent. The two nations are remarkable similar. Each is a 
product of English tradition. The geographical separation, with 
the exception of the Great Lakes is simply a man-made boundary. 
The greatest extent of the boundary is based on the abstract 
concept of a line of latitude, invisible in reality. Each nation 
has a sizable and distinct minority group. So it seems natural 
that each country would seek to partially define itself in
c Other United States-British North American boundary controversies 
included St. Croix River, Passamaquoddy Bay Islands, Northeast 
boundary, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, Commission for St. 
Lawrence and Great Lakes, Commission for Lake Superior and Lake of the 
Woods, the Rocky Mountain to Pacific boundary, and the San Juan Island 
dispute.
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opposition to the other. In fact, this becomes a necessary step 
encourage distinct and separate nationalism.
Canada and the United States have remained separate 
entities. The struggle to remain distinct is a more prevalent 
subject of discourse in Canada. Canada has made its distinction 
from the United States as an important aspect of its own sense of 
nationalism. However, because Canadian nationalism to some 
extent revolves around the idea of distinction instead of more 
noticeable physical differences there is a constant apprehension 
concerning a unity with the United States. Because of the sheer 
size and importance of the United States, unity would mean the 
disappearance of Canada.
As legitimate as Canadian uneasiness may or may not have 
been, the fact remains that Canadians were uneasy about their 
great neighbor to the south. Canadian attitudes towards the 
United States "contained elements of profound distrust."4 This 
distrust made many Canadian excessively critical of any American 
actions relating to Canada. This was especially true of the 
Alaskan boundary dispute.
Canadian distrust of the United States was a major factor 
influencing the vehemence of Canadian support for the claims put 
forward by the Wilfred Laurier's Administration. This distrust 
provided the opening needed for many Canadians to take "an easy 
but illogical step... to assume that the case of their country 
was the stronger of the two."5 This primary belief resulted in a
6
legacy of interpretation that positioned the dispute as a lasting 
reminder of British negligence towards Canadian needs.
The Alaskan boundary dispute has been extensively written 
about in Canadian history because of the importance it had to 
that country. The lack of alternative interpretation has left 
the dispute subject to Canadian bias. Perhaps the most important 
oversight by previous historians is the lack of interest paid to 
the Hay-Herbert treaty, which provided for the final settlement 
of the controversy.
In opposition to the dominant historiography, an in-depth 
study of the benefits of the Hay-Herbert treaty will lead to a 
fuller understanding of the Alaskan boundary dispute. The 
British negotiation of this treaty provides evidence of its 
willingness to take up the torch for Canadian interests, while 
American negotiation further acknowledges the United States' 
respect for its neighbor to the North.
The Hay-Herbert treaty provided the settlement for the 
Alaskan boundary dispute. The treaty was negotiated by Secretary 
John Hay and British Ambassador to the United States Michael 
Herbert. The even-numbered tribunal established by the treaty 
benefited the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. While 
the negotiation of the treaty was a diplomatic success, many 
positive aspects of the treaty were Destroyed by political 
actions surrounding the actual tribunal. The negative political 
actions of the United States were unfairly highlighted in the
7Canadian contemporary press, while the actions of the Canadian 
commissioners were overlooked. In addition, previous historical 
interpretations have focused too heavily on the political actions 
while excluding any mention of the benefits of the treaty. With 
the passage of time, more adequate reflection can be achieved in 
relation to the dispute. Therefore this interpretation of the 
Alaskan boundary dispute will be instrumental in pointing out and 
correcting traditional bias in the historiography of the Alaskan 
boundary dispute.
THE DISPUTE' S ORIGINS
The Alaskan boundary dispute's origins stem from a long 
tradition of misunderstanding and mismanagement. The unclear 
legacy through early Ukases, diplomatic actions, treaties, and 
conferences set the stage for understanding the importance of the 
Hay-Herbert Treaty and the actions that would follow.
The northern Pacific coast is a jagged mountainous 
coastline. The largest feature of this area is the Archipelago 
Alexander, a long line of islands extending from Puget Sound at 
47° 03' to Taiya Inlet at 59° 29'.1 The archipelago islands are 
14,000 square miles in combined area. As Charles Hallock 
described it in 1886, "the coast maintains the same indented and 
tortuous line, flanked by innumerable islands."2 In this maze of 
islands and mountains a boundary was to be laid down.
The coast of Alaskan panhandle has two mountain ranges.
The first range is St. Elias Range which runs along the coast and 
the tops of which create the islands of the archipelago. The 
second, higher range, is the Coast Range which is located behind 
the St. Elias Range to about 63° north latitude and makes up the 
watershed for the upper Yukon.J Neither range creates a single 
mountain crest splitting the panhandle. Instead these chains 
form a sea of mountains.
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The North American Pacific coast was explored by numerous 
Europeans during the period from 1539 to 1603, including Juan 
Rodriguez Cabrillo, Sebastian Vizcaino, Frenande? de Cordova y 
Aguilar, Sir Frances Drake, and William Cavendish. However, 
these explorers restricted their voyages to the lower latitudes. 
The Russian explorer claiming the Right of Discovery to the 
panhandle was Vitus Janassen Bering (a Dane employed by Russia) 
in 1741.4
Peter the Great commissioned Bering to explore the north 
Pacific just weeks before his death in 1725.5 On July 15, 1741, 
the vessel St. Paul discovered the coast near latitude 55° 21'.6 
Bering secured Russian possession of the North Pacific coast 
above 55° latitude, and the Russians soon defended this claim.
In the Ukase of Empress Catherine given December 22, 1786, she 
ordered ships into the North Pacific for "the protection of [o]ur 
rights on lands discovered by Russian seafarers." In addition 
to the naval presence, the Russian claim was fortified by the 
settlements on Bering and Copper Islands.8
The British had a claim to "Right of Discovery" and 
occupation on the North Pacific on Vancouver Island. The 
British, however, had stronger claims to lands just inland from 
the Pacific. The Hudson's Bay Company had expanded steadily 
westward. With increased fur trade nearing the Pacific, the 
British sought Pacific ports to ship furs to the Orient.
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One of the first Britons to explore the Alaskan coast was 
Captain James Cook. A leading explorer, and famous for his world 
travels, Cook, sailed to Alaska on his third voyage in 1788. Near 
the Alaskan coast, Cook stayed away from large areas of the coast 
when the winds became strong. The result of Cook's actions was 
that "several great gaps were left unexplored."9 Particularly 
notable is the large gap in the area between 50° and 55°.10 Cook 
was not impressed with the value of the northern territory, as he 
deemed most of the furs from this area as inferior in quality, 
with the notable exception of the sea otter.11 However, the 
prospect of discovering a Northwest Passage was still enticing as 
a route to the Orient.
The Orient was an important market. It provided much of 
the incentive for exploration of the North Pacific in search of a 
Northwest Passage during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
It was during this time that George Vancouver made his 
investigations in the Alaskan Panhandle in 1792, '93, '94, which
were published in 1798.12 The nature of Vancouver's explorations 
was not a Lewis and Clark type expedition to map and chart 
resources and landmarks. Instead, Vancouver was primarily 
searching the north Pacific coast in an attempt to find the 
western end of the Northwest Passage. His charts contained only 
vague estimated descriptions of inland features.3 However,
See Vancouver's chart on next page.
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Illustration 1: Vancouver's Map
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Vancouver's charts and narrative would play a critical role in 
the Alaskan boundary dispute.
The first major diplomatic action concerning the Alaska 
coast was the Ukase of 1799. Tsar Paul I issued the Ukase of 
1799 which claimed the southern boundary of Alaska down to 55° 
north latitude.3,3 Foreign countries generally accepted the Ukase. 
It provided the Russian-American Company with exclusive rights to 
the area. The Ukase was effective for twenty years, then in 1821 
another Ukase was issued.
The Ukase of 1821 produced the first major controversy.
Tsar Alexander I took the occasion to extend the southern 
boundary to the 51° north Latitude and to close the north Pacific 
Ocean to foreign shipping.14 This was an important action for 
whereas the Ukase of 1799 "had called forth no protest; it was 
only when the 1821 Ukase carried the latitude to 51° that the fur 
traders of the United States and Great Britain were aroused."15 
By this time, both the United States and Great Britain had claims 
to the Oregon territory that extended to 54° north latitude.
More important than the territory were the navigation rights.
The Russians claimed a 100-mile nautical boundary which virtually 
closed the Bering Sea to foreign nations.
Stern opposition from both the Americans and British met 
Tsar Alexander's Ukase. However, neither country wanted to 
humiliate the Russian government so no outright rejection of the 
Ukase was issued. As for the Ukase of 1821, it "was a political
13
blunder. It almost solicited attack."16 However, resolving the 
situation with a treaty everyone could agree on would take four 
years. The Americans were the first to resolve the situation 
with Russia.
The Russian-American Convention of 1824 resolved the matter 
between the Americans and Russians. This dispute was the easier 
to solve. The Americans had a weaker claim to the northern parts 
of the Oregon territory. Therefore they were more generous in 
conceding territory to the Russians. For their part the 
Russians, eager to establish a precedent boundary with the 
Americans for their later negotiations with the British, were 
willing to drop their marginal claim to lands south of 54° 45' 
north latitude.
The main objective of the Convention of 1825 between Great 
Britain and Russia was to disavow the Ukase of 1821. Great 
Britain was primarily concerned with navigation rights in the 
North Pacific, while the boundary line was a secondary 
consideration.17 However, unlike the Americans who required only 
a north-south boundary, Great Britain and Russia also had to 
negotiate an east-west boundary. The east-west parallel in the 
northern area was gradually pushed back by the British to the 
141° of longitude. However in drawing the panhandle boundary, 
"two considerations made a parallel of latitude an awkward 
boundary line. One was the west to Southeast trend of the coast 
south of Yakutat Bay; the other was the uncertainty as to how far
14
east such cession should reach."18 Therefore a natural boundary 
was considered highly desirable.
The negotiation for the panhandle boundary ran into many 
problems. None of the negotiators had any first hand knowledge 
of the area, and beyond, that it appeared that no one else did 
either. "There were... no original and trustworthy charts of the 
Northwest Coast except those of Vancouver, which had been 
published twenty-six years before the Convention."19 While 
Vancouver had explored and charted many if not all of the inlets 
and bodies of water, at the time of the negotiation of the 1825, 
"no one of record had ever penetrated fifty miles inland."70 The 
maps that the negotiators did have were "imperfect and 
antiquated."21 The result was a natural boundary that would be 
based on the scanty evidence of the geographic features of the 
panhandle then available.
The Russian claim to exclusive navigation of a hundred-mile 
territorial limit was against common international law. The 
established limit was a three-mile zone. The Russians had little 
hope of obtaining all they claimed in the Anglo-Russian 
negotiations of 1825, because of the drastically more substantial 
British settlements and claims in the inland position of the 
North Pacific and international law being on the British side. 
Therefore a concerted effort was made to establish as much 
territory on the southern boundary of the Alaskan Panhandle as 
possible. The Russians made "the retention of the 55° of
15
Latitude as an approximate southern boundary... a face-saving 
issue."22 The British eventually agreed and after considerable 
negotiation a treaty was signed.
The Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825 established the boundary 
of Alaska. This treaty established a line starting at the 
southernmost tip of Prince of Wales Island that was to continue 
north along the Portland Channel until the line intersected with 
the fifty-sixth degree of latitude. From there, the line was to 
"follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the 
coast" until it reached the one hundred forty-first degree of 
longitude.‘3 An important stipulation was that the mountain 
summit line was to extend no farther than ten leagues from the 
coast.24 However, the Alaskan Panhandle is filled with 
indentations and protrusions,b The coast is a jagged line full 
of channels, inlets, sounds, and promontories. The mountain 
summit line referred to by the Treaty of 1825 proved elusive on 
such a coast.
The actual map line adopted by the Russians was a stretch of 
land protruding ten leagues in from the coast without regard to 
any mountain chain. The Russian Admiralty map of 1827 also 
displayed the boundary as encircling large inlets such as the 
Lynn Canal. The Russian claims were undisputed, even after the 
United States purchased the territory in 1867. The boundary only 
came into question when Canadians objected to the American
b See Map 1 on next page.
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continuation of the Russian interpretation during the late 
nineteenth century.
American involvement in the Alaskan Panhandle reemerged in 
1867, when the United States purchased Alaska from the Russians. 
The treaty ceding Alaska to the United States was signed March 
30, 1867, ratified copies were exchanged on June 30, 1867, and 
formal transfer took place on October 18 , 1867.25 The United 
States now increased its border with British North America. The 
immediate transfer was uncomplicated, even though the precise 
boundary had not been demarcated.
The precise boundary received little attention. The 
Alaskan Panhandle and surrounding areas were of little 
importance. The territory's natural resources were untapped.
The area had few settlers and no immediate need for a precise 
boundary was apparent. However, interest in Alaska, especially 
its natural resources would soon heighten.
Alaska's natural resources first became apparent in 1861.
In that year, gold was discovered on the Stakheen River.26 The 
discovery resulted in a population influx. Stakheen River mining 
began and with it interest in a precise boundary between the 
American and Canadian territory.
Gold discoveries in the late nineteenth-century provoked 
Canadian interest in the boundary. Most notably the Yukon Gold 
Rush of the 1890's illustrated the usefulness of a seaport in 
order to ship supplies and also military troops to the Yukon gold
18
fields. The Canadians claimed the correct summit line 
encompassed the mountains arising almost immediately from the 
coast. The Canadians also disputed the boundary encircling the 
inlets. This encircling of inlets cut Canada away from any deep 
water ports on the Alaskan Panhandle, most notably the Lynn 
Canal. The final Canadian objection to the Russian-American line 
was the position of the Portland Channel. The Canadians 
maintained the Portland Channel referred to the Pearse Canal, 
instead of the ODservatory Inlet.c Canadian claims concerning 
the mountain summit line, the Lynn Canal, and the Portland Canals 
became the central issues of the Alaskan boundary dispute.
The resulting interest provoked governmental correspondence 
in relation to the boundary. Clearly, the boundary was to be 
situated along the mountain summit line. However, as people 
became more familiar with the terrain of the area, the difficulty 
of delineating this line became apparent. The Lieutenant 
Governor of British Columbia, Joseph W. Trutch, wrote to Canada's 
Secretary of State Joseph Howe on July 11, 1872. The letter 
referred to the 1825 treaty boundary line. Trutch maintained, 
"[t]ne description therein given of this line of demarcation is 
not so clearly defined as to render it readily traceable on the 
ground." He suggested a clear line should be substituted.2' The 
suggestion was not followed up on and the border remained 
unmarked. This response was typical of many efforts to resolve
c See Map 2 on next page.
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the boundary early. There was still relatively little interest 
in the area.
In 1877, the Peter Martin case displayed the problems that 
could result from an undelineated boundary. Peter Martin was a 
miner working in Canadian territory north of the Stikine River. 
Martin was arrested in Canada and had to be transported through 
the United States. During the transportation, Martin tried to 
escape. The attempted escape resulted in an additional charge of 
assaulting an officer. Martin was tried and convicted. However, 
Martin petitioned for release because the second assault had 
taken place on United States soil. An investigation resulted in 
Martin being freed. After reviewing the circumstances, the 
decision was that the second event had in fact happened in United 
States territory thirteen miles north of the mouth of StiKine 
River. The result for the Alaskan boundary dispute was that a 
temporary boundary line was agreed to in the Stikine River. The 
line was twenty-one miles inland from the mouth of the river.28
Donald Camerond conceived the Coast Doctrine. Cameron 
claimed that rather than following the shoreline (which included 
the inlets and bays) the treaty should follow the general trend 
of the coast. The line should disregard the deep inlets and form 
a more or less straight line without jutting inland. Cameron 
submitted a report containing this argument the Canadian
a Colonel Donald Cameron was appointed to research the boundary for the 
Canadians. He was also the son-in-law of Sir Charles Tupper, the 
leader of the opposition in Canada during much of the boundary dispute.
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Secretary of State on February 18, 1875.29 Cameron's line 
received the approval of the Eritish Columbian government. 
However, it would be some time before it caught on in Ottawa. 
Official Canadian claims were not made until the Joint High 
Commission in 1898. Even when it did attract attention in 
Ottawa, it was not necessarily the ’’practical policy of the 
Canadian government" so much as "the credo of a small but 
influential coterie in the department of the Interior."30 The 
problem with Coast Doctrine was it "had no warrant in intention 
of the treaty makers nor support from precedent."31
The temporary boundary on the Stikine River was the first 
strike against the Russian-American ten-league boundary. The 
surveyed boundary was twenty-one miles inland not the thirty to 
thirty-five miles that ten leagues would require. The moving of 
Stikine River from thirty miles to twenty-one miles encouraged 
Judge J. H. Gray, a member of the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia. He began to argue for larger Canadian claims. During 
the summer of 1884, he argued the line should not extend up the 
Portland Canal but instead up Clarence Strait to Behm Canal. 
Gray's line then followed a thin line along mountain summits 
close to the boundary.32 The area and nature of the dispute was 
beginning to change from a need to demarcate an agreed upon line 
to the proper interpretation of the Treaty of 1825.
The Portland Channel held few of the features the 1825
claimed it to have. The Portland Channel was a long inlet north
22
of the Pearse Channel and southern extreme of Observatory Inlet. 
The Portland Channel could be viewed as flowing down either of 
these waterways until it reached the Pacific. The treaty was 
unclear as to which waterway it was to follow. In addition, 
Portland Inlet was almost due east of the southern tip of Wales 
Island. Therefore it would be very difficult for it to follow in 
a northerly direction from that southern tip, that the treaty 
acknowledged as the correct direction for the boundary to follow. 
Finally, the channel was to strike the 56° ia-’tude to form the 
easterly boundary. However, the Portland Channel missed the mark 
falling roughly ten miles short of the 56° north latitude.
The southern boundary became an important secondary note to 
the mountain summit l :oe, as the Canadian cook advantage of
the discrepancies between the treaty and the actual channel. In 
1894, Alexander Begg* wrote "the interpolation of the three 
words, 'called Portland Channel,' has rendered the wording of the 
treaty obscure and the boundary impracticable."33 He continued on 
to state, "Doubtless the treaty 'Called Portland Channel' should 
have been written "called Behm's Channel," and should be so 
interpreted."34 Early Canadian interpreters of the treaty claimed 
that name had not been in the original treaty but added later, 
unfortunately for their case, they were incorrect. The British 
Columbian theory, as it was called, was extremely weak, due in
' Alexander Begg was a newspaperman and historian. 
Daily Mail correspondent in Western Canada.
He was a Toronto
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large part to the fact that Portland Channel was specifically 
named in the treaty.
The process of cleverly interpreting the wording of the 1825 
treaty continued in Canada. R. E. Gosnell in Yearbook of British 
Columbia for 1897 put forth the claim that "ocean" referred to 
the high sea on the outside of the archipelago, so the ten league 
measurement should be measured from the outside of the 
archipelago islands.35 This claim would even more drastically 
reduce the American possession. However, the archipelago claim 
never attracted the influential supporters the "Coast Doctrine" 
attracted.
The United States was also beginning to see the shortcomings 
of the 1825 treaty. Ti the 1880's tb united States pur srd
the idea that the Treaty of 1825 was "fatally indefinite and that 
an application of its terms was [a] geographical impossibility in 
the light of existing knowledge of the physical features of the 
region in which the boundary line must be laid down."36 The 
mountain chain had always been in question. However, with Judge 
Gray's and Donald Cameron's reinterpretation of the Portland 
channel the question soon broadened.
The Canadian claims were hard for Americans to understand.
In the words of George Davidson, "[f]or sixty years the terms of 
the resultant Convention of 1825 had been accepted as explicit 
and satisfactory, but since 1885, contentions have been made in 
order to nullify its provisions."37 In actuality, the Canadians
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wanted to reinterpret the provisions not nullify them. Yet, it 
was curious to American why the Canadians had not pushed their 
claims before 1885 and not protested American claims officially 
until 1898.
The main reason for Canadian and British neglect was
because the area lacked importance. The area in dispute was not
especially valuable during the 1880's. As for the size:
The area in dispute was insignificant in terms of 
relation of its size and resources to those of Canada 
and the United States, but the forces of national 
feeling magnified its importance until it produced a 
crisis in the relations of the British Empire and the 
United States.38
As for the Canadians pushing new claims, as the American Review 
of Reviews put it, why not, as "[t]he whole subject is ,ie in 
which the Canadians had nothing to lose and everything to gain."'9
A major factor in the increased interest in the area was 
the Yukon gold discoveries. Gold had been discovered in Alaska 
as early as 1849 by the Russians at Kenai Peninsula. Additional 
discoveries occurred near Wrangell in 1861, at Sumdum bay in 
1870, near Sitka in 1871, near Juneau in 1873, on the Fortymile 
River in 1886, and in 1893 at Hope, Rampart, and Circle.
However, it was the 1897 discovery of gold by George Washington 
Carmack, Tagish Charlie, and Skookum Jim on Bonanza Creek that 
set of the Great Klondike Gold Rush.
While the gold made some prospectors rich, the rush made 
even more merchants wealthy. News of the gold fields spread 
quickly. As word got out, the excitement spread and prospectors
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appeared in Skagway and Dyea. The Alaskan boundary dispute 
received increased attention, not because of the gold, but 
because of the increased trade. Prospectors were buying American 
goods, and entering Canada though American ports. This meant 
custom duties and American trade. Early in 1898, 90% of all 
Yukon trade was in American hands.40 Canadians saw much of 
subsidiary value of their gold fields slipping into American 
hands.
The Canadian government in general, and Minister of the 
Interior Clifford Sifton in particular, put a priority on 
regaining the wealth created by the Yukon gold Ids. What was 
needed was an all-Canadian route to the Yukon. The problem was 
that the most acceptable route to the area was through the 
Chinook and White Passes at the head of the Lynn Canal. The 
United States was in possession of this strip of the panhandle. 
Skagway had been founded as late as 1897, but even then the 
Canadians had not thought of protesting its settlement. However 
at the top of the Lynn Canal another body of water split off, 
this was Pyramid Harbor.
In the Alaskan boundary dispute, the acquisition of Pyramid 
Harbor became the chief goal of the Canadian government. It was 
noted that, "since 1885, all attacks to break through this 
lisiere of the Convention of 1825 have been mainly, in fact 
solely, to obtain a port of ingress into British Columbia from 
the Archipelago."41 The need for a port was understood first in
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British Columbia, however this did not become apparent, for the 
most part, to the Canadian government until the discovery of gold 
in the Yukon.
The fact of the matter was that Canadians could not hope to 
settle Pyramid harbor until the dispute was settled, for the 
United States would permit such settlement. In an effort to 
salvage what they could of the Yukon trade, the Canadians sought 
other all Canadian routes. The most popular plan called for the 
co ; ;truction of a railroad. In April 1898, a railroad from 
Observatory Inlet to Teslin Lake was planned but was dropped on 
May 25, 18 98, by the Liberal government.'12 On February 8, 18 98, 
the Liberals introduced the Canadian Yukon bill. The plan called 
for a railroad from Stikine River to the Yukon. The plan failed 
in the Conservative dominated Senate. Another attempt at an all 
Canadian railroad route from Edmonton also failed in the Senate. 
The Conservatives did not want the Liberals to profit from the 
control of railroad contracts.43 The result was that 
transportation alternatives which might have defused the Alaskan 
dispute, were destroyed in Canada by partisan politics.
The pressure and lure of the wealth of the gold trade 
continued to be a strain on the settlement of the Alaskan 
boundary dispute. And for good reason: as of January 1, 1903, 
the reported gold production of the Klondike district since 1897 
was over $79, 000,000.44 Furthermore, the drama was heightened by 
the "the belief that all the territory in dispute was gold­
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bearing."45 _h parties were faced with the realization that 
:>ld discovered in a disputed area could lead to more hostility 
and burden the negotiations further.
The possibility of hostility did not lead immediate action. 
After the provisional settlement of the Stikine boundary and 
through Cameron's new interpretations of the treaty of 1825, 
negotiation for an interpretation of the treaty received less 
attention. The Joint High Commission of 1888, between the United 
States and Canada met to deal with issues relating to both 
nations. The Alaska boundary dispute was only informally 
discussed and no official action was taken on it.45 In the 
discussions of the commission, each country assigned a leading 
expert to meet. The United States assigned William Dall,f while 
Canada appointed Dr. George Dawson.9 They discussed the matter; 
however nothing was agreed to during the talks so the commission 
did not take up the matter.
The first major talks about interpretation of the treaty 
were heard on the 10ch of February 1892. On that date, United 
States Secretary of State James G. Blaine and John W. Foster" had 
a conference with Canadian representives Sir Julian Pauncefote,1 
John S. Thompson (Minister of Justice), George E. Foster *1
f William Dali was employed by the United States Coast and Geodetic 
Survey.
1 Dr. George Dawson was employed by the Canadian Geological Survey.
!l John W. Foster was the United States agent in the Bering Sea 
Arbitration and an expert on the Alaskan boundary dispute. He was a 
former lawyer, diplomat, and Secretary of State.
1 Julian Pauncefote was the British Ambassador to the United States.
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(Minister of Finance), and Mackenzie Bowell (Minister of 
Customs). Two days later on the 12ch of February, the Canadian 
submitted a proposal for impartial authority to decide the 
boundary. The outside body was to rule on the mountain line and 
Portland channel. The United States objected to this proposal, 
insisting that the boundary need only be surveyed, not 
interpreted. Instead a joint survey was agreed upon.4' The joint 
survey results were completed in 1895.48 These surveys were taken 
from the heads of the inlets, which did little to solve the 
dispute.
The Americans were still operating under the assumption 
that the matter could be worked out without an interpretation of 
the wording of the treaty but instead where the mountain line 
existed. It would appear that the British were following the 
same train of thought. On February 18, 1898, the Colonial Office 
suggested arbitration to define the border around the heads of 
inlets not to interpret whether they should cut through the 
inlets or not.49 However, the matter was not subjected to 
independent negotiations but was included in the issues put 
before the Joint High Commission of 1898-99.
The Joint High Commission would discover just how different 
and important were the conflicting claims of the United States 
and Canada. The Alaskan boundary dispute had developed over 
misunderstanding and neglect. The dispute's origins began with 
the 1825 treaty meant to define the boundary, and continued
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(though mainly unappreciated) through to the discovery of gold 
which placed increased importance on settlement of the dispute.
WORKING TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT
Many outside forces affected the settlement of the Alaskan 
boundary dispute. The first step towards solving the dispute was 
the commencement of official negotiations. These negotiations 
occurred during the life of the Joint High Commission. The 
Alaskan boundary was lumped in with other American-Canadian 
issues. Following the Commission, other issues such as the 
Panama Canal, the Boer War, and domestic politics would also 
interfere with an Alaskan settlement.
The first official negotiation between the United States 
and Canada of the Alaskan boundary dispute was held at the Joint 
High Commission of 1898-99. The Commission was an attempt to 
solve numerous conflicts between the United States and Canada, 
including the North Atlantic fisheries, Bering Sea sealing, 
armaments on the Great Lakes, reciprocity and the Alaskan 
boundary. The Commission consisted of six members from the 
United States; Senator Charles Fairbanks, Senator George Gray 
(later replaced by Senator Charles Faulkner), Representive Nelson 
Dingley, John W. Foster, John A. Kasson3, and T. Jefferson




Coolidgeb. The British, seeking to appease their North American 
subjects appointed only Lord Herschell.0 Lord Herschell was 
joined by one representative of the still independent colony of 
Newfoundland (Sir James Winter0) and four Canadians (Prime 
Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Louis H. Davies®, Sir Richard 
Cartwright1, and John Carlton* 9).1
During the Joint High Commission, Canada submitted two maps 
in reference to the Alaskan boundary dispute. In one, the 
boundary line ran through Clarence Strait. In the other, the 
line ran through Pearse Canal.2 This was the first sign that the 
Canadian government had officially accepted the "British 
Columbian theory." The acceptance of this theory provided 
evidence that Canada was going to stretch its claims as far as 
possible. The result was that the Alaskan boundary became the 
stumbling block that divided the Joint High Commission.
The Americans were frustrated by Canadian claims concerning 
Alaska. The Americans did not understand the importance Canada 
placed on the issue. The Americans believed Canada was simply 
trying use the Alaskan issue as leverage for other negotiations. 
Secretary of State John Hay explained, "We are absolutely driven 
to the conclusion that Lord Herschell put forward a claim that he
9 T. Jefferson Coolidge was a former minister to France and financier.
0 Lord Herschell was the Lord High Chancellor of England.
d Sir James Winter was the Attorney General of Newfoundland.
9 Sir Louis Davies was the Minister of Marine and Fisheries. 
f Sir Richard J. Cartwright was a member of Parliament and Minister of  
Trade and Commerce.
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had no belief or confidence in, for the mere purpose of trading 
it off for something substantial."3 However, the Canadians were 
profoundly interested in Alaska and a substantial concern for 
Canada was a harbor on the Alaskan coast.
The Joint High Commission's Alaskan boundary subcommittee 
included Prime Minister Laurier, Lord Herschell, Senator 
Fairbanks, and John W. Foster.4 Lord Herschell became an 
important advocate of all the Canadian claims. He forcefully 
argued even for claims lie had little belief in, such as the 
"British Columbian theory." Secretary Hay wrote to Henry White71 
about Lord Herchell's view that "virtually the whole coast 
belongs to England."J Hay thought the coast was "a mere matter 
of common sense" and "impossible that any nation should ever have 
conceded" or accepted "such a ridiculous and preposterous 
boundary line" as the Canadians claimed.6 However, there 
appeared to be room to negotiate. Lord Herschell claimed "[t]he 
only part of the boundary where it is of any grave importance 
whether your contention or ours be well founded is in the 
neighborhood of Lynn Canal."7 Lord Herschell, while arguing for 
all the Canadian claims, realized that the most pressing need for 
Canada was a port to supply goods to the Yukon.
The United States was poised to compromise. After numerous 
proposals, the United States offered to grant "occupation, use 9
9 John Charlton was. a member of Parliament and Free Trade Commissioner 
to the United States.
r‘ Henry White was the United States First Secretary in London.
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and control" of Pyramid Harbor.8 In this offer, which would be 
the final compromise offered by the United States, Canada would 
get the harbor they desperately wanted out not official title to 
the land. The one aspect restricting outright Canadian 
sovereignty was that if Canada left Pyramid Harbor unoccupied it 
would revert back to United States control.9 The Canadian 
negotiators seemed inclined to accept this proposal. However, 
word of the compromise leaked out and an opposition appeared. 
Notable in this regard is the letter from American ship builders 
in Washington, Oregon, and California which pressured President 
William McKinley to withdraw the offer, which he did.10 American 
shipping interests were strongly against the establishment of any 
Canadian port, which was the chief goal of the Canadians. The 
result was a deadlock on the Alaskan boundary. According to 
Laurier "our American fellow commissioners were at first and 
almost to the last disposed to come to a reasonable compromise."lj 
However, no compromise would be made during the life of the Joint 
High Commission.
The United States, frustrated by Canadian claims, 
encouraged, a separate plan for the boundary arbitration from the 
other issues. The main problem with separate arbitration was the 
disposition of the arbitration court. The British sought a 
European judge and the Americans a Latin American judge. When 
the question of the judge's nationality resulted in a stalemate, 
the United States proposed submitting the Alaskan boundary to a
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separate body composed of three American members and three 
members representing Great Britain and Canada. The Canadians 
opposed this type of tribunal and insisted on an odd numbered 
body, including an outside arbitrator.12
The deadlock on the Alaskan boundary question resulted in 
abandonment of the Joint High Commission. The Canadians insisted 
that if the Alaskan question could not be solved there was no 
point in coming to agreements on the other issues. The Joint 
High Commission had already adjourned in Quebec on October 10 
then reconvened in Washington on November 9, 1898.12 The United 
States argued for another adjournment until the Alaskan matter 
could be solved diplomatically, instead of the complete break-up 
of the commission as the Canadians proposed. The matter was 
solved on February 20, 1899, when the Joint High Commission 
adjourned with the understanding the Commission should reassemble 
at Quebec on the 2nd of August. However, since no agreement had 
occurred on the Alaskan boundary dispute during the break, the 
Commission did not reassemble.14 In the end the Joint High 
Commission "separated without being able to settle anything 
whatever because neither party could yield upon the Alaskan 
boundary question."15
Despite its failure, the Joint High Commission was an 
important stepping stone. It provided a clearer definition of 
the dispute. The Americans were finally confronted with an 
official Canadian interpretation of the boundary. The dispute
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had grown from a mere demarcation of a boundary, to a question of 
interpretation. Hope of settlement failed after the Joint High 
Commission. A major "reason for this [the non-continuation of 
negotiation] was that the Canadians abandoned any active part in 
negotiations and preferred to act merely as critics of the more 
active role played by the British and American governments.”16 
However, the British held an important bargaining chip.
The British were offering a new Panama canal treaty in 
exchange for a favorable Alaskan boundary. In the words of 
Secretary Hay, "I obtained assurance from British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, that if High Commission should reach an 
agreement, British consent to your proposed Clayton-Bulwar Treaty 
would be given at once."17 The United States had been interested 
in building a Central American canal, but had found itself 
restricted by the Clayton-Bulwar treaty. In that treaty of 1850 
the United States and Great Britain had agreed "neither the one 
nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any 
exclusive control over" a Central American canal.18
The Spanish-American War had displayed the difficulties of 
moving the American navy from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The 
conclusion of the war had also supplied the United States, 
through the capture of the Philippines, a stepping-stone to the 
China trade.1 The expanded role of Pacific trade for American
The importance of the China trade was a great consideration. It must 
be remembered that Secretary Hay issued his first Open Door Note on 
September 6, 1899.
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exports would also greatly benefit from a Central American Canal. 
President McKinley realized the importance of negotiating a new 
treaty. However, Congress was filled with strong supporters of 
building a canal with or without a new treaty. The Senators' 
only stipulation was that it be strictly American. President 
McKinley was much more in touch with the importance of honoring 
treaties. His administration was extremely interested in 
renegotiating the Clayton-Eulwar Treaty.
The British were not opposed to releasing the United States 
from its obligation. However, they also saw the opportunity for 
"a quid pro quo for American concessions with regard to the 
Alaskan boundary."19 The Canadians were the major proponents of 
this plan. However, in the end the British agreed with the 
United States to deal with the issues separately.
The British realized Canada's desire to use the Clayton- 
Bulwar treaty as leverage in the Alaskan boundary. Therefore, 
before Great Britain signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty abrogating 
the Clayton-Bulwar Treaty, they pressured Laurier to give 
Canadian consent. Laurier, realizing the futility of the issue, 
consented to the Hay-Pauencefote treaty under British pressure 
and saw an important negotiating tool disappear.20
The first Hay-Pauncefote treaty was signed February 4,
1900. The treaty ran into stiff resistance in the Senate. In 
the end the Senate passed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty on December
20, 1900. However, the Senate had added three amendments to the
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treaty. On February 22, 1901, Great Britain decided to retain 
the old Clayton-Bulwar Treaty rather than accept the amended 
version. This was a strong blow to Anglo-American relations.
The process started all over again, but would prove more 
fruitful.
Henry White visited Lord Salisbury to start efforts for a 
new canal treaty. Once more Salisbury suggested compensation in 
Alaska for a new canal treaty. However, as their conversation 
continued both realized the benefit of having each issue 
negotiated separately. The second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was 
signed November 18, 1901 and ratified by the Senate on December 
16, 1901.
Also influencing the settlement of the Alaskan dispute were 
other factors occurring concurrently. Immediately after the 
adjournment of the Joint High Commission, tensions were high.
The disputed land was filled with lawless prospectors who 
amplified the possibility of trouble. To prevent trouble in May 
1898, the Canadian Yukon Field Force commanded by Lieutenant 
Colonel T. D. B. Evans was sent to the Yukon Gold Fields. The 
force encompassed two hundred and three volunteers from the 
Permanent Force.21 By September 1899 the headquarters were 
transferred to Dawson City and the force reduced by half. In 
1900, the remainder of the garrison was withdrawn.^2 United 
States troops were not immediately sent in. Hay and McKinley 
agreed in May 1899 to postpone the dispatch of American soldiers
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to Pyramid Harbor because of negotiations for a treaty 
settlement. 23
The result of these negotiations was net a treaty but 
rather a temporary boundary. On October 20, 1899, a Modus 
Vivendi was agreed upon.24 The boundary only covered the district 
just north of the Lynn Canal. Negotiation of a full boundary 
treaty was difficult because the Americans did not want to submit 
the matter to arbitration. Secretary Hay explained the American 
position in the following way: "although our claim is as clear as 
the sun in Heaven, we know enough of arbitration to foresee the 
fatal tendency of all arbitrators to compromise."25
In 1900, efforts were made to resolve the boundary dispute. 
The same obstruction in the form of the deciding body could not 
be satisfactorily solved. Great Britain argued the boundary was 
always open so Venezuela style arbitration would be the most 
appropriate. The United States argued that the actual 
demarcation of the boundary was open but the interpretation of 
the treaty had not been in question for seventy years and 
therefore Venezuela-style arbitration3 was not appropriate.26
The United States and Great Britain had tried to agree on a 
arbitration treaty during the Venezuela boundary dispute. The 
United States had called for all territorial claims to be sent to 
arbitration. Great Britain had claimed that disputes of 
territory "may be, much graver as well as much more difficult to
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decide."27 The British also believed that such a clause would 
result in "an enormous multiplication" of speculative cases.28 
Because of these beliefs, the United States and Great Britain had 
not signed a treaty. The result was that a treaty which could 
have bound the United States to arbitrate the Alaskan dispute had 
not been signed. The United States was in a position where it 
was not forced to arbitrate.
Another sticking point was that Canada wanted to include a 
clause insuring that no matter what the tribunal decided Skagway 
and Dyea would remain American while Pyramid Harbor would be 
under Canadian jurisdiction.29 The Americans claimed that this 
was inappropriate because Skagway and Dyea had been established 
and settled by Americans, whereas the Canadians had not 
established any settlements in Pyramid Harbor.
While negotiations for a treaty continued on, many outside 
matters began to affect the United States, Great Britain and 
Canada. Perhaps the most influential matter was the Boer War.
In October 1899, the Boer, or South African, War broke out. The 
war lasted two years and eight months.30 The war tested not only 
the strength of Great Britain and the Empire but also their 
European relations. Great Britain found little European support 
for its actions in South Africa. In fact, the German Kaiser 
issued a telegram congratulating the President of the Boer 
Republic on success in repelling a British raiding force. Also
: The United States had forced Great Britain into an arbitration made up
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complicating the issue was the fact that the Boers were decidedly 
better opponents than first suspected.
Great Britain was in desperate need of assistance.
However, Canada a major colony found itself split in support of 
the British side. After all the Boer War was a colonial war, and 
Canada was a colonial country in which many important figures 
(especially among French Canadians* ) had aspirations of someday 
breaking from Great Britain themselves. Also, the Irish in their 
continual battle against Great Britain sided with the South 
Africans, and Canada was home to many Irish immigrants.
Therefore, additional incentives were explored by the British to 
promote more Imperial Nationalism. Of course one of these 
incentives was support in the Alaskan boundary dispute. British 
officials such as "Lord Minto, among others, had argued that 
Canada's contribution in South Africa might be traded for British 
backing on Canada's Alaska boundary claims."31 Canada, however, 
was not the only country exploiting the Boer War.
The United States was the only major power to sympathize 
with Britain during the Boer War.32 The United States did not 
officially support the British in the war. Indeed, there was 
some pro-Boer and considerable Irish support. President Theodore 
Roosevelt, because of this, refused publically support the war or
of odd numbered court including a foreign judge.
* The French-Canadians saw little reason for Canadian troops to be used 
to stop a rebellion against Great Britian. Many French-Canadians hoped 
to one-day split from the British Empire, and certainly found few 
benefits to the Canada in supporting such a war.
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carry out further negotiation of the Alaskan boundary.j3 Domestic
politics were not the only incentives waiting for the Boer War to
end. Roosevelt was aware that some Canadian support of Great
Britain during the Boer War was an effort to gain favor ir the
Alaskan dispute. Roosevelt decided to wait out the Boer War so
Canada could not use its support in the Boer War as a quid pro
quo in the Alaska boundary settlement.34
Another important trend was developing during the years
1896-1903. This trend was the withdrawal of Great Britain from
North and South America. Historian William Morton explains,
What Canadians failed to realize was that since the 
Venezuela crisis of 1895-96, Great Britain was finally 
and fully withdrawing from the Americas and leaving 
them, with Canada, to an unconditional American 
hegemony. The crass imperialism of the Republican 
partly at the end of the century was partly the cause, 
partly the result of this withdrawal.35
Canadians seemed unaware that all the attempts to secure the
inlets and heads of canals had "come from [the] Dominion of
Canada, and not from the Government of Great Britain."36 This
general trend certainly was boosted by the ascension of Roosevelt
to the Presidency.
President McKinley was shot on September 6, 1901 and died 
September 14, 1901. The result was that Canada would have to 
deal with "the big stick of a man whose invincible self- 
confidence suggested that he had come to an amicable 
understanding with the Deity."37 That man was Theodore Roosevelt.
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President Roosevelt is remembered for his jingoist approach 
to American diplomacy. The Alaska boundary dispute has often 
been interpreted as another example of his Big Stick diplomacy. 
The American Review of Reviews remarked, " [a]bout nothing had Mr. 
Roosevelt ever been more frank or more uncompromising than about 
this Alaskan Question." Roosevelt simply felt there was nothing 
to arbitrate.
Roosevelt's Big Stick was seen early by the Canadians, 
perhaps earlier than it was even wielded. President Roosevelt 
sent troops to the Alaska Panhandle in 1902. With the placement 
of troops in Alaska, Canadians observed a "hardening of the 
American attitude". "Thus the prospects of a friendly 
accommodation, never good, became steadily worse."39 However, the 
movement cf troops to Alaska did not represent a military build­
up in preparation for war. "These were scarcely 'secret 
preparations for war'; they were rather reasonable precautions to 
prevent the international negotiation of the Alaskan boundary 
question from being complicated by local disturbances."'10 
Roosevelt's reputation seems to have preceded his actions.
Later, Roosevelt would be much more forward with his actions. 
However the reaction to the placement of troops reveals how 
Canadian apprehension concerning the United States fueled 
misinterpretations of his actions.
Theodore Roosevelt took office in 1901 with little interest 
in settling the Alaskan boundary dispute. Roosevelt had great
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confidence in America's claim. He was also satisfied with the 
modus vivendi. He felt no need to arouse any problems with Great 
Britain, and advised his ambassadors to "let sleeping dogs lie."41 
When the issue arose again .in 1902, Roosevelt took a firm stance.
The Alaskan boundary issue was never officially closed 
after the Joint High Commission broke off indefinitely. The 
boundary dispute was the issue that no one wanted to handle in 
fear of rekindling the fire. The anticipation associated with 
not dealing with the situation was due to the fear of the rapid 
hostility a new gold rush in the disputed area would create. The 
Canadians believed that when it came to the transient, and often 
lawless, miners, prevention was the best policy. The Canadians 
sought to reopen the discussion in an effort to prevent future 
disruption. Roosevelt was suspicious, he saw Canada as pushing a 
phony claim. He wrote to Secretary of State John Hay in 1902 
saying:
They [the Canadians] now say that as they got the 
false claim in, trouble may come if it is not acted 
on. I feel a good deal like telling them that if 
trouble comes it will be purely because of their own 
fault; and although it would not be pleasant for us it 
would be death for them.42
As much as Roosevelt would have liked to take vengeful action, he 
simply could not take the associated risk. Instead, after 
considerable encouragement from Hay, Roosevelt agreed to proceed 
with negotiations.
President Roosevelt took a different approach to 
solving the dispute. He promoted the idea of a commission
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instead of arbitration. In 1902, he told Hay he would 
appoint "three commissioners" but would also tell them "in 
no case to yield any of our claim."43 Roosevelt wanted the 
tribunal to consist of representatives of each country.
This early example of Roosevelt's conception of the 
tribunal foreshadowed his later actions when selecting his 
jurists.
The final relevant development which occurred during 
the Alaskan Boundary dispute was the growth of Canada.
During the 1890's a wheat boom in Canada along with the 
excitement of the gold discoveries increased Canada's 
growing national pride and prospects.44 The result was that 
from 1901 to 1911, Canada's population grew faster than 
that of the United States.45 Canadians were coming to 
believe that their nation would become the next United 
States in terms of World Power. In fact, Prime Minister 
Laurier explained "As the nineteen-century was the century 
of the United States... so shall the twentieth century belong 
to Canada."46
Wilfrid Laurier became Prime Minister in 1896, when his 
Liberal Party won federal power for the first time in twenty-two 
years. When Wilfred Laurier became Prime Minister, Clifford 
Sifton from "expansionist western Canada" became Minister of the
47Interior.
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Up until 1896, it was noted in the American Press that,
"[s]o far the so-called Canadian 'aggressions' are all on paper. 
The Cameron line has been drawn but has only a imaginary 
existence."48 However, that was soon to change with the new 
government.
While Laurier*s attitude towards the Alaskan boundary 
dispute betrayed "a lack of inner conviction, a merely formal 
commitment to a popular but unrealistic cause," this could not be 
said, of Sifton.49 Sifton "adopted the coast doctrine with great 
enthusiasm."50 Where Dawson’s Map of 1887 had cut across four 
inlets, Sifton's 1898 map cut across eighteen.51 And while in 
1890, the Canadian government had said the boundary would be "no 
difficulty," after the Liberal election in 1896, the Canadian 
view was now that the boundary difference was "very 
considerable. ”52
Negotiations continued through 1901-02, on a sketchy basis. 
In November 190.1, Laurier agreed to an even numbered tribunal as 
long as one jurist on each side would not be a citizen of the 
United States or a British subject.33 The United States, with 
Roosevelt feeling firmly in the driver's seat, rejected this 
offer. Finally in October 1902, Prime Minister Laurier returned 
from London to Canada and announced he had agreed to an even- 
numbered tribunal.54
The Alaskan boundary dispute had clearly became entangled 
with many other issues from the Joint High Commission to 1902.
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These other issues hindered the settlement. Only as the other 
issues were resolved could the negotiation of treaty focusing 
strictly on the Alaskan boundary dispute be agreed on.
THE HAY-HERBERT TREATY
A settlement that established and promoted goodwill between 
all the countries, indeed required providing explicit benefits 
for each country. The Hay-Herbert treaty was carefully 
negotiated to supply important benefits to the United States, 
Canada, and Great Britain. The Hay-Herbert treaty, which 
provided for the final resolution of the Alaskan boundary 
dispute, was signed in 1903.
The advantages of the Hay-Herbert treaty to the United 
States began by providing a settlement on the terms that it had 
originally proposed in 1898. The treaty provided for the six- 
member tribunal with three Americans and three Britons or 
Canadians. Canadians also realized that the treaty favored 
America''s original proposal. The Manitoba Free Press declared, 
"The proposition is virtually the same as that brought forward by 
the American members of the joint high commission three years 
ago."1 However, the acceptance of American terms was a 
deliberate act to apply pressure on the United States to submit 
to some form of negotiation. The United States could not refuse 
a treaty with the makeup they had originally proposed, however, 




The Americans sought an even numbered tribunal so as not to 
relinquish any control. The British-Canadian design would have 
required an outside person or body. The final verdict would have 
hinged on a foreign country or individual. Many American 
citizens did not want to risk any outsiders telling them that 
America had to relinquish land to Canada. Canada realized 
America's contention that "the balance of power must be held by 
no one outside of the United States."2 The even-numbered 
tribunal was a response to Americans' strong sense of 
sovereignty. If a negative decision were reached, it would 
require the consent of at least one American. The even-number 
tribunal assured American accord with the decision.
American solidarity was all that was needed in order to 
insure "a practical extinction of any chance of a decision 
hostile to their plans."3 The Americans could stand firm and the 
worst that could happen was a deadlock. The Hay-Herbert treaty 
became America's chance for victory without the possibility of a 
result hostile to their desires. The treaty may not have 
guaranteed American victory but it did all but officially 
eliminate the possibility of a Canadian victory. As one Canadian 
newspaper put it, "Canada will not be the Gainer."'1 The 
Americans could hardly turn down what was being described "as a 
'heads I win, tails you lose' arrangement."5 While American 
interests seemed well protected, they would have even more 
safeguards.
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While the organization of the tribunal resembled the 
original American proposal, the region subject to interpretation 
reflected the Canadian proposal. Unlike earlier considerations, 
the ports of Dyea and Skagway were considered open for debate. 
Their inclusion resulted in a considerable chance for the United 
States. Dyea and Skagway's inclusion meant the possibility that 
American towns could become Canadian property. Towns that had 
not been protested during the original settlement could become 
Canadian.0 Certainly many problems would occur with the 
thousands of American citizens possessing American land claims in 
these areas, not to mention the disgrace for the American 
government. This important obstacle was remedied when Canadian 
Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier informed United States Secretary 
of State John Hay that Canada would settle for compensation and 
not require the return of the actual land.7 The result was a 
confirmation of friendliness and a more acceptable treaty in the 
eyes of America.
The inclusion of Skagway and Dyea highlighted the main 
American contention against any negotiation of the Alaskan 
boundary; Americans possessed the land. Americans interpreted 
the Canadian claim as a greedy assertion resulting from the 
discovery of gold in the Yukon. The Americans were troubled by 
the Canadians' dramatically changing claims. The Canadians 
seemed to be substantially increasing the area they claimed
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during the late nineteenth century.® Yet the important fact 
remained, while the Canadians were continually changing their 
claim, Americans were governing the area.
Everyone knew which country was in charge in the area. 
Canadians could claim as much as they wanted, but it was doubtful 
they could acquire any of the land without the consent of the 
United States. The Canadians could not simply change their 
claims and plant the Canadian flag on new land. Even in the 
early days, one Canadian pioneer explained when asked why he had 
not planted the British flag, "If any man had planted a British 
flag then his life would not have been worth much."3 The bare 
facts of the matter were that the United States held, the disputed 
land. The fact the United States agreed to any negotiation of 
Canadian claims acknowledged America's concern for amiability in 
Canadian-American relations.
American friendliness towards Canada would only stretch so
far. The Americans were content to appease Canada by subjecting
the matter to an interpretation committee. The Americans would
dismiss the Canadian claims, as long as the American claims never
came into serious contention. As for American acquiescence,
Henry Cabot Lodge summed up American sentiment:
They [the Canadians] have an idea, I think, that we 
will yield anything. They are in error. We are 
anxious to remove a cause of international controversy 
but not to yield undoubted right, & so far as the 
territory goes we are perfectly content to disagree, 
for we have it ail in our possession.9
See Map 4 or. following page.
5Illustration 4: Canada's Changing Claims
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The tribunal offered the perfect structure for the Americans to 
dismiss Canadian claims without jeopardizing their possession of 
the land. However, not everyone was happy with a treaty whose 
chief benefit was the retaining land that was already in the 
United States' possession. Many Americans felt that the matter 
should not have been sent to a tribunal. Frederick Holls0 warned 
President Roosevelt in a letter, that the Hay-Herbert Treaty was 
"very likely to be exceedingly grave."10
At first glance, however, the Hay-Herbert treaty benefits 
to the United States seem to outweigh any possible benefits the 
Canadians or the British could obtain in the matter. However, it 
would be naive to think that all that was at stake was territory. 
The Canadians forced American culpability. The Americans would 
not simply maintain the land because of their prominence as a 
nation. The settlement was a display of Canada's growing power. 
The Canadians were forcing the Americans to acknowledge a 
Canadian claim, one which the Americans had previously refused to 
acknowledge. In terms of national pride, few things could 
compare with the once small colonies of British North America 
coming together to force the imperial giant of the United States 
to arbitrate the question of lands currently in American 
possession.
b Frederick Holls was an attorney specializing in international 
relations. He was the United States secretary to the 1899 
International Peace Conference.
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The fact that the United States had agreed to an outside 
body to settle the boundary was a tremendous victory for Canada. 
Canada did not determine the terms of treaty, but in the v/ords of 
Laurier, "In one way it was a great victory."11 Laurier explained 
that Canada had acquired "over the pretensions of the States" a 
settlement that put American territory in jeopardy.12 Laurier was 
correct in displaying pride in the fact that the treaty was a 
recognition of America's obligation to acknowledge Canadian 
claims. The Winnipeg Free Press sounded off in agreement, 
professing "The fact that the United States had agreed to submit 
the subject to any tribunal was a step in advance, because it had 
all along held that there was nothing to arbitrate."13 The 
Canadians gained something substantial, namely a tribunal with 
the United States. In question would be land, which the United 
States had possessed for over thirty years. For the first time 
the United States had made their land vulnerable. The Hay- 
Herbert treaty, as a result, should be viewed as a diplomatic 
victory for Canada.
The verdict of the tribunal was secondary and also likely 
to be beneficial. The most probable outcome of the tribunal 
would be a deadlock, and a deadlock would serve two Canadian 
purposes. First, the deadlock would establish the fact that 
there was a questionable border. The United States would have 
set a precedent with this tribunal. In the event of a deadlock,
the United States would find it harder to refuse arbitration in
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the future. If fact, in their argument before the tribunal,
Great Britain claimed that by joining the 1903 convention the 
United States had "tacitly admitted that the boundary had not 
been settled."14 Second, the Canadian public's demand for a 
resolution would be eased. The Canadian government would have 
dealt with the issue. A stalemate could have mollified the 
average Canadians' belief in the Canadian claim, which would 
relieve political pressure. Therefore, a deadlock in the Alaskan 
boundary tribunal would have benefited the Canadians.
While a deadlock was probable, an American victory was not 
out of the question. Canada seemed to be risking a considerable 
amount for the moral victory of forcing the United States to 
submit the issue to arbitration. However, this may not be the 
case. The Canadians did not really have that much at stake. No 
Canadian settlements would be taken from their control and even 
the settlements they could conceivably gain may not have had 
significant value. The main enticement for a favorable boundary 
line was the addition of a port. Tr.<. Manitoba Free Press 
described the possible port as "a port in name only, and is 
absolutely worthless to this country as a basis for controlling 
the trade of the Yukon."15 After all, these new ports would still 
have to compete with the established ports at Skagway and Dyea. 
With reports such as these circulating in the newspapers, the 
Canadian public was certainly aware of the questionable value of
the territory. Along with some question as to the value of the
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land, there is also evidence of a lack of faith in the le_. .(....racy 
of the Canadian claim.
The Canadian claim did not have the strength most of the 
public believed it to possess. The Canadian government was 
likely just looking to save face. The real risk to the Canadian 
government was not the loss of a possible port but the perception 
of Canadian weakness. Prime Minister Laurier feared the Canadian 
public would regard any resolution as Canada surrendering or 
sacrificing its interests to the United States. Laurier wanted 
to dispose of the Alaskan boundary controversy without committing 
the Canadian cardinal sin of selling out to America or allowing 
Great Britain to sell out Canada to the United States. The 
tribunal, made up of "impartial jurists of repute" was a perfect 
vehicle to let the Canadian public down gently. When asked about 
the provisions as to the selection of the jurists, Prime Minister 
Laurier's response was "the only provision is that they are to be 
jurists of repute."16 The hope was jurists of the highest repute 
would be chosen, allowing a pro-American decision to be viewed 
with a sense of justice in Canada. As John Hay's biographer 
Tyler Dennett claims,
All of the information received during the summer (of 
1902), however, confirmed the impression conveyed by 
previous correspondence that Laurier was seeking an 
opportunity to escape with as little loss of prestige 
as possible from an awkward situation in which he had 
placed himself as the champion in Canada of doubtful 
rights in Alaska.17
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This seems to support the idea Laurier doubted Canada's claims. 
This was certainly the stance of John Hay when he wrote President 
Roosevelt saying, "I knew, both from Pauncefotec and Laurier that 
they had no belief in their case...."18 The Canadian government's 
moral victory was quite substantial, due to the fact that their 
leader, and once great proponent of Canada's Alaskan boundary 
rights, had relatively little faith in verification of Canadian 
claims. The fact remained "from the Canadian point of view, the 
treaty was a distinct improvement over the earlier drafts."'9 In 
the end Laurier agreed to the even-numbered tribunal that later 
Canadians would call a "lopsided arbitration."20
The final contributor, Great Britain, had perhaps the least 
at stake and the most to gain. It was in need of American 
friendship. Great Britain's power was fading while America's was 
growing. The British had just completed a less than impressive 
showing in the Boer War, while the Americans had recently won an 
empire in the Spanish-American War. More to the point, Great 
Britain needed friends to counter Germany. The Germans were 
expanding which caused a growing threat to Great Britain.21 In 
order to gain American friendship, the British wanted to dispose 
of all Anglo-American controversies. The list of grievances 
included the Venezuelan blockade,1 North Atlantic fisheries,
: Lord Julian Pauncefote was the British Ambassador to the United States 
before Sir Michael Herbert.
3 The time of the Treaty was crucial, not for any Alaskan disturbances 
but instead because of problems in Latin America. Great Britain had 
joined Germany in a blockage of Venezuela, in an effort to force that
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Bering Sea sealing, and the Alaskan boundary. The Hay-Herbert 
treaty was used as a symbol that the Anglo-American friendship 
had not been broken by the Venezuelan problems. One London 
correspondent noted that the treaty gave "undoubted proof of the 
uninterrupted friendliness existing between Great. Britain and the 
United States."22 According to Ambassador Michael Herbert, "[t]he 
time had come for Great Britain to choose between Germany and the 
United States."23 The symbolic nature of Anglo-American 
friendship within the Hay-Herbert treaty was evident from the 
beginning.
The British also expected to gain Canadian esteem with the 
Hay-Herbert treaty. The British hoped to be seen as doing the 
Canadians a favor by establishing a mechanism for the settlement 
of Canadian claims. Canada had been pushing Great Britain for a 
settlement, but as a British colony it had no power over its own 
foreign affairs. Therefore, Canada, particularly Prime Minister 
Laurier, pressured Great Britain to resolve the matter. After 
the Hay-Herbert treaty was made public, the London Times 
acknowledged that, "Canada has been pressing for a solution of 
the Alaska problem for more than a year."24 The Times also 
applauded Laurier's role in the settlement saying, "it [the 
treaty] is owning to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's initiative"25 and 
attributing it "to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's personal persistence."20
country to pay its debts. The blockade received strong condemnations 
from the United States. The increase in hostilities resulted in
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Canadian pressure finally paid off and the British could reap 
some of the benefits. Lord Lansdowne® gave perhaps the most 
telling description of the negotiations when he explained, "[i]f 
he [Lord LansdowneJ has conceded anything he has conceded it with 
the full consent of Canada. Nay, upon her urgency."27 Appeasing 
Canadian desire for a settlement was an additional benefit for 
Great Britain's negotiation of the treaty.
Great Britain sought friendship and the Hay-Herbert treaty 
provided friendship. The treaty was an attempt to resolve the 
Alaskan boundary dispute officially and legitimately. Mere 
importantly, the treaty was to mark a new era of Anglo-American 
friendship. As the London Times noted, the even-numbered 
tribunal was "an effort to settle differences by friendly 
discussion, and implies a high degree of confidence on each side 
in the equity and friendship of the other.'"18 This confidence and 
equity would present Great Britain and the United States with a 
lasting bond. After all in the words of the Times, the tribunal 
would be "settling the points in dispute in the only manner that 
leaves no sense of soreness or disappointment.'"19 Clearly, the 
Treaty's tribunal system was seen as important to prevent hostile 
reaction to a settlement.
The Hay-Herbert treaty did have drawbacks for the British. 
One considerable British disadvantage was that the treaty did not
British urgency to ratify the Treaty. As a result it was ratified 
before the Canadian government officially responded to the treaty.
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force the United States into arbitration. The British were still 
embittered from being forced to arbitrate the Venezuelan boundary 
dispute.4 In early negotiations, they sought some retribution by 
seeking to force the Americans into arbitration of this dispute. 
The United States had championed arbitration between Venezuela 
and Great Britain but now balked at the idea of submitting an 
American dispute to arbitration. Arthur H. Lee, a member of 
Parliament, made sure to point out to Roosevelt, "the 
inconsistent attitude of the U.S. in this matter."30 However, the 
Hay-Herbert treaty only contained one mention of the word 
"arbitral" in the preamble. This reference was due to what 
President Roosevelt called "an unfortunate accident on the part 
of the copyist.”31 The offensive word was soon removed. The 
London Times acknowledged the Americans' belief that the members 
were representatives of the country, not arbitrators.32 This lack 
of formal arbitration was, in the words of Laurier, "a single 
slight blemish."33 The British seemed to agree and overlooked 
this opportunity for petty retaliation.
Aside from the lack of any arbitration, the Hay-Herbert 
treaty created an almost ideal situation for the British. They
e Lord Lansdowne (Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice) was the British 
Foreign secretary.
: The Venezuelan boundary crisis (1895-96) arose from arguments over the 
proper border between Venezuela and British Guiana. The main dispute 
focused on the Orinoco River. Venezuela appealed to the United States 
to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in-order to force the British to 
arbitrate the issue. The United States to up the takes of demanding 
arbitration. In the end, the British (facing German threats in South 
Africa) agreed with the United States to arbitrate the border.
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could end the Alaskan boundary dispute on terms acceptable to 
both the Canadians and Americans, thereby encouraging a new 
Anglo-American friendship. After all, in the words of the London 
Times, the treaty was "a new and lasting bond of union between 
the two countries, both of whom at last see that neither has any 
separate interest so vital as friendship between both."34 The 
British it seems were the biggest winners in the Hay-Herbert 
treaty. They would be satisfying the Canadians and Americans 
while promoting a stronger Anglo-American bond, at a time when it 
was sorely needed.
After reviewing the benefits and drawbacks of the treaty in 
relation to each country, it is clear to see the Hay-Herbert 
treaty was if nothing else a beneficial accomplishment through 
the time of its negotiation. The treaty held important benefits 
for the governments of the United States, Canada, and Great 
Britain, all three of which seemed anxious to end the Alaskan 
boundary dispute. Where the treaty should rank in historical 
significance is another issue, but the London Times remarked 
that, "(i]t is probaoly on the whole a greater diplomatic triumph 
for all concerned than was the Hay-Pauncefote treaty9 or any 
other of recent times."35 The treaty was the best solution the 
circumstances would permit. However, the friendly goals of the
9 The Hay-Pauncefote treaty, signed between the United States and Great 
Britain, allowed the United States to build the Panama Canal but barred 
the United States from fortifying the canal. The Treaty replaced the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, which required joint Anglo-American 
construction.
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treaty would be overshadowed by the actions of Theodore Roosevelt 
and Canadian reaction to them.
On February 4, 1903, Sir Wilfrid Laurier expressed his 
pleasure with finally creating a mechanism for settling the 
boundary, and his hope that "a strong body of jurists will 
forever dispose of that question."36 This was the intended legacy 
of the Hay-Herbert trial. It was an understanding among friends 
to overcome an obstacle in that friendship. Unfortunately this 
aspect of the Alaskan boundary dispute has been overlooked and 
under-appreciated because of the actions that would follow the 
signing of the Hay-Herbert Treaty.
ROOSEVELT'S ACTIONS
The Hay-Herbert Treaty provided a settlement, on basically 
friendly terms. However, the beneficial aspects of the treaty 
never had an opportunity to develop. Almost immediately after 
the announcement of the treaty friction began to develop. The 
central problems resulted from President Roosevelt's appointees 
and political actions. These aspects provided the Canadian 
public and later Canadian historians with the evidence they 
needed to support the Canadian commissioners' claims. However, 
these actions and appointments have been unfairly emphasized.
This evidence, which is the focus of most histories of the 
Alaskan boundary dispute, has been taken at face value and not 
critically analyzed.
The United States Senate ratified the Hay-Herbert Treaty on 
February 11, 1903. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was in charge of
getting it through the Senate. In order to secure passage, Lodge 
was compelled to tell certain senators who Roosevelt's appointees 
would be.J' However a "clever strategy" still had to be employed 
to secure ratification.2 The Treaty was sent to an executive 
committee during a period when the senate chamber was empty. The 
treaty was still in trouble until it was disclosed that Roosevelt 
would appoint Senator Lodge, Senator George Turner, and Secretary
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of War Elihu Root as the American commissioners. The 
ratification vote was taken by a voice vote without a listing of 
yeas and nays. Ratified treaties were exchanged March 3, 1903.3
The members of the Tribunal were to be appointed 
immediately.4 When the final treaty was signed, Roosevelt's 
appointments of the "impartial jurists of repute" the treaty 
mandated, instead resembled representative commissioners.J Great 
Britain and Canada were expecting United States Supreme Court 
Justices to be appointed to the tribunal. Roosevelt seemed aware 
of this desire when in the words of historian Allen Nevins, 
Roosevelt made "the gesture of inviting Supreme Court justices to 
act."6
President Roosevelt "it would appear" asked all the judges 
of the Supreme Court to be American jurist for the tribunal.7 No 
direct evidence is available to support the actual request of the 
Justices, but Hay reported to Ambassador Herbert that all the 
Supreme Court judges were asked to serve.8 However, the 
forcefulness of Roosevelt's approach may be questioned. It seems 
he had no problem persuading Root to serve. In Root's words,
"the President drafted me--I should say impressed me--shanghaied 
me— into the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal."9 However, one does not 
get the feeling that the Justices felt subject to the same 
pressure.
Public outcry in Canada began almost immediately. The 
Manitoba Free Press declared the American appointees "have
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expressed themselves in anything but an impartial manner upon the 
points involved in the dispute."10 The London Times Ottawa 
correspondent echoed this sentiment by saying it was unlikely the 
American commissioners would take an "unbiased view of the 
evidence."11 The New York correspondent tried to counter these 
claims saying he knew of no objection and any objection could not 
be "entirely valid.1,12 However, the fact of the matter was many 
Canadians found dissatisfaction with Lodge, Turner, and Root for 
various reasons.
Henry Cabot Lodge was the most objectionable in the view of 
most Canadians. Both Lodge and President Roosevelt knew the 
Canadians viewed the Senator negatively. Lodge remarked, in a 
letter to the President, that he was "not popular in Ottawa."i3 
Lodge had always been an outspoken opponent of the Canadians' 
claims. As early as 1896, Lodge had called the claims "trumped 
up and manufactured to an extent that strained credulity."14
Secretary Hay also regarded Lodge as a "regrettable" choice 
calling him a "most evil genii", who acted "as if the devil were 
inspiring him."15 This was due in large measure to the fact that 
Lodge simply would not remain silent about his views on the 
issue. Lodge made a speech in Boston claiming that "no nation 
with an ounce of self-respect could admit the justice of Canada's 
contention."16 Speeches such as this, fueled Canadian claims of 
Lodge as "uncompromising", "aggressive", and "bitter".17 Lodge 
countered, "Those were only political speeches" and at the
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tribunal "I shall have to take an oath to consider the evidence 
impartially and I shall do so."18 However, it is important to 
note that John Garraty, Lodge's biographer, maintained "if Lodge 
really believed that he was going to be an impartial judge he was 
surely deceiving himself and no one else."19 Most likely, Lodge 
was defending himself to avoid being removed from the tribunal 
and knew he would not be impartial. In fact, "Senator Lodge was 
an aggressive nationalist."20
As if Lodge's bias was not enough to infuriate the 
Canadians, he also lacked the legal experience to make him a 
highly qualified jurist. His legal resume included Harvard Law 
school but no experience in legal practice. The Canadian claim 
that Lodge was not impartial or experienced seem to be well 
founded. The reason Lodge was selected was "because he wanted to 
go and because he was the President's close friend and advisor."2'1 
Lodge was also an important figure in American foreign relations.
Roosevelt’s second appointment was Elihu Root. Root was 
the nation's Secretary of War, a position the Canadians found 
hard to reconcile with an impartial jurist. Root's legal 
background was sound and he was considered one of the top legal 
minds in America. Root had the "highest legal attainment and 
[wasj of unimpeachable personal integrity."22 However, as the 
Secretary of War and he reported directly to the President.
Also, in that capacity Root had been the first United States 
official to send the military into the area in question.23 With
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such strong ties to the President, Root’s appointment was 
questionable in the minds of the Canadians. While he may have 
been "less strongly committed than his colleagues," he certainly 
left much to be desired by the Canadians.24 It must be noted 
however that Root had already decided to resign his duties as 
Secretary of War when he was appointed to the tribunal.25
Senator Turner was the least known among Roosevelt's 
appointees. The immediate reaction in Canada was dislike for 
Turner because he was from Washington state. John Ewart 
explained:
That, no doubt, is far from conclusive as to his 
partiality. But this much may be said: that decision 
in favor of Canada would have been easier for any 
other man in the United States (except members of the 
government) than for a politician of the state of 
Washington and a resident of Spokane.20
Turner was in fact from Washington, but an in-depth examination
of him is consistently left out of most histories of the Alaskan
boundary dispute. Therefore, a closer look into Turner's life
will perhaps shed light on his appropriateness as an "impartial
jurist of repute."
George Turner was born in Missouri in 1850. At the age of 
19 and without attending law school, he was admitted to the Bar 
in Alabama.27 This was probably a result of his "inquiring mind 
and a photographic memory."28 Turner served as a Federal Marshal 
and was an important member of the Republican party in Alabama. 
As a result of his work he was awarded a judgeship.
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Turner became a Judge on the Supreme Court for the 
Territory of Washington from 1884 to 1888.29 After this term as a 
judge, he returned to the practice of law. Turner was successful 
and regarded as "a 'born' lawyer" to whom "the basic principles 
of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence come as naturally to his mind as do 
the lips of the babe to the mother's milk."30
In 1897, Turner returned to politics, but this time as a 
Democrat. Turner was elected to the United States Senate on a 
fusionist® platform. While in the Senate, Turner was an 
outspoken critic of imperialism in the Philippines. He also 
opposed the Spanish-American War, insisting the United States 
should proclaim the independence of Cuba before entering the 
conflict.31
In relation to the Alaskan boundary claims, Turner had 
spoken out prior to his appointment to the Commission. However, 
his biographer Claudis Johnson claims Turner spoke in favor of 
the United States claims "but not in a jingoist manner."32 As for 
his selection to the tribunal, "[i]t was generally reported that 
Senators Foraker, Lodge, Spooner, and Perkins recommended 
Turner."33 What Roosevelt "probably did not know about Turner—  
What Che Senator's friends and a few others did know— was that he 
might be equal to the strain of voting against the claims of the 
United States if upon evidence presented, they should prove to be
aThe fusionist members that elected Turner were the Silver Republicans, 
Populists, and Democrats.
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unfounded."34 It appeared apparent to Secretary Hay in his letter
to Ambassador Choate when he remarked,
Turner is one of the most prominent lawyers west of 
the Rocky Mountains, and represents a great body of 
opinion there which has always been more or less 
hostile to England, and his influence and standing 
will be most valuable in influencing the opinion of 
the Northwestern states in favor of a just and 
amicable settlement.35
Turner's connection to the Northwest was seen as benefit to the 
Americans. In the event that a decision was made in favor of 
Canadian claims, it was important to have a respected and 
influential member who was associated with the area which would 
be most hostile. His selection meant a voice to calm an angry 
section of the country, if need be.
While the general trend in the historiography of the 
Alaskan Boundary dispute is to follow Ewart's assumption that 
Turner's connection to the Northwest made him an unqualified 
selection to the tribunal, this would be an unfair assessment of 
Turner. Charles Tansill, the one notable American historian of 
the dispute, thought that, "[t]he British objections to Turner 
were unreasonable."36 While Turner was still from the Pacific 
Northwest, March 1903 is term as a senator from Washington 
ended.
In the end, Roosevelt's selections were within reason.
After all, the President had appointed a close friend and leading 
senator (who was crucial in the ratification of the treaty), his 
top advisor and a representative who could explain any award to
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those most opposed to any negotiation. The appointments were far 
from the claim that they "utterly violated the terms of this 
article."3' And certainly offer little support for Frederick 
Gibson's claim that, "The inescapable, and at the same time 
deplorable, conclusion is that if these men could have been said 
to be impartial they would not have been appointed."38 These were 
certainly not the best choices but after reflecting on their 
actions during the award, any lasting apprehension about their 
selection should be dismissed. As regards the selection of 
Roosevelt's appointees, perhaps the Canadian reaction was 
overemphasized. 0. D. Skelton remarked, "So far as the actual 
decision of the tribunal was concerned, it is doubtful whether 
the change in the personnel of the court made any material 
difference. Experience does not show that judges, however fair 
in the handling of details of evidence, are any more immune than 
other mortals from the national or social prejudices which 
unconsciously shape interpretation."39
The crucial measure in evaluating the appointments is their 
ability to meet the qualifications set out in the Ray-Herbert 
treaty. They were to be "impartial jurists of repute."40 Lodge, 
Turner, and Root have been unfairly categorized as not meeting 
this standard. The Canadians may have been under the impression 
that the jurists were to be juages but according to Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary a jurist is 1. A person who 
practices law; 2. A person skilled in the philosophy or science
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of law.41 All the American appointments meet these requirements. 
As for repute, it no argument can be made against these 
individuals as to their position, rank, or status. The final 
requirement of impartiality is subject to interpretation.
However, their actions during the tribunal speak against the 
notion that they were prejudicial or biased.
However, that did not stop later historians from 
criticizing the selections. Roosevelt's appointments according 
to Gibson were a "demonstration of international chicanery ."4i 
And Roosevelt "was guilty of serious diplomatic dishonesty" in 
those appointments.43
"Very moderate criticism of these appointments by Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier in the Canadian House of Commons enraged 
Roosevelt" who wrote a letter on March 25, 1903 instructing 
jurists not to compromise.44 He directed the jurists as to what 
was open for discussion and what was not. He acknowledged that 
they would "of course impartially judge the questions that come 
before you for decision." However, more importantly, he stated 
"...the claim to Skagway and Dyea, and therefore of course Pyramid 
Harbor, is not in my judgement one of those which can properly be 
considered open to discussion."45 This statement created a vast 
problem, for the major Canadian contention was not even to be 
contemplated by Roosevelt's jurists. However, all information
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available suggests little attention was paid to these 
instructions by the jurists.13
Roosevelt was confident in the American claim. However, 
Roosevelt being Roosevelt, he wanted it perfectly clear that he 
expected a victory. He began to issue political threats to the 
British government. The most famous example of Roosevelt's 
bullying is his letter to Justice Oliver W. Holmes, who was in 
London in July 1903. Roosevelt took this opportunity to exploit 
Holmes's personal relationship with Colonial Secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain.
Roosevelt framed the letter as a response to Holmes's 
letter, yet was careful to add, "...if you happen to meet 
Chamberlain again you are entirely at liberty to tell him what I 
say...."46 Roosevelt then proceeded to lay out his view of the 
Alaskan situation.
He claimed the reason for his consent to the tribunal was 
due only to his "very earnest desire" for good Anglo-American 
relations. He maintained the Canadians' case lacked warrant on 
all but "two or three lesser points." After his explanation for 
consenting to the tribunal, he then issued a series of threats. 
Roosevelt declared that if the commission failed to decide the 
issue, he would "request Congress to make an appropriation which 
will enable me to run the boundary on my own hook."47 Roosevelt
b Turner claimed he told Roosevelt he was not going to decide the case 
until he heard all the arguments according to a letter that ha wrote in 
twenty years later.
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had begun wielding his Big Stick. He re-emphasized his view of 
the Canadian claim, saying the Canadian claim was "as 
indefensible as if they should now suddenly claim the island of 
Nantucket" and "no more worth discussing than the claim that the 
49th parallel meant the 50th parallel or else the 48th."48 He also 
sought to make it clear that this would be the "one last effort" 
at diplomatic settlement of the boundary.
Roosevelt made it clear that if the Tribunal did not agree 
"there will be no arbitration of the matter" instead he would 
"take a position which will prevent any possibility of 
arbitration hereafter...." The Americans would simply lay out the 
boundary "without any further regard to the attitude of England 
and Canada." Roosevelt concluded his letter by stating he should 
have taken this action in the first place, but had refused 
because of his "wish to exhaust every effort to have the affair 
settled peacefully and with due regard to England's dignity."49 
Roosevelt's letter exhibits his unyielding stance, along with his 
efforts to influence the British government and, through it, the 
British judge.
Roosevelt also had his staff hard at work. Roosevelt 
encouraged everyone he could to apply pressure to the British 
jurist Lord Alverstone. The First Secretary of the United States 
Embassy at London, Henry White, hoped to tell Lord Alverstone,
that the Americans "have consented to the arbitration in order to
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afford [Canada] a loophole to escape from an untenable 
position."50
Roosevelt's strong efforts to encourage an outcome 
favorable to the Americans would not go unnoticed by the 
Canadians. The Canadians presented strong opposition to 
Roosevelt's actions. They started with attacks on the jurists 
Roosevelt selected. Eventually, they would attack the decision 
of the tribunal, an effort that would negatively color the award 
as well as the Hay-Herbert treaty.
The Canadians began to see their worst fears realized.
Canada had always viewed the United States with a sense of 
apprehension. They were wary of any actions their larger 
neighbor might take that could possibly be interpreted as 
aggressive. The Canadians were quick to interpret Roosevelt's 
actions in the most negative light. Canada felt betrayed by 
Roosevelt. In the words of one Canadian Minister,c it was 
"evident the United States desired to convert the proceedings 
into a farce."51 Canadians began to threaten that, "unless the 
United States acts up to both the letter and the spirit of the 
Alaskan Boundary Treaty no meeting of the commission will be 
held."52
The first Canadian objection was to Roosevelt's 
appointments. Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier attempted to induce 
England to force different appointments. He submitted a
° This most likely refers to Minister of Interior Clifford Sifton.
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memorandum to England stating Canada's objections to Root, Lodge, 
and Turner.53 The British government refused, and as the Manitoba 
Free Press fatefully explained, "All that Canada can do... is to 
protest against their appointment, as not being in accordance 
with the treaty, and that has been done."54 The Canadians had 
little recourse. The Canadians would have to accept the American 
appointments.
The Canadian government had entered into the Hay-Herbert 
Treaty with at least some expectation of losing its case.
However, it anticipated the tribunal's award to be viewed as 
fair. The Canadian government expected the Canadian public to be 
satisfied. President Roosevelt’s actions turned the Canadian 
public away from the complacency expected in association with 
Canadian defeat. As Canadian historian John Ewart concluded, 
"[n]o one, however, imagined that, this time, dishonor and 
treachery, rather than mere compliance, would be the principal 
feature attending the loss of another bit of Canadian 
territory."55 The Canadians, always in fear of being cheated by 
the United States, were beginning to believe they had been 
"hoodwinked."56 Canadians natural prejudice towards the United 
States influenced them to react negatively to President
Roosevelt's actions.
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The British appointed one commission, Lord Alverstone.d 
Alverstone was the Lord Chief Justice of England. He had also 
served as attorney general for over twelve years. His selection 
was greeted warmly by both the Canadians and Americans. Great 
Britain's other two selections were left to Canada to make.
After receiving word of the American appointments the 
Canadians tightened their own ranks. They followed the letter of 
the treaty and appointed personnel with legal experience. The 
Canadians selected Sir Louis Jette, a former member of the 
Supreme Court, and John D. Armour, the Chief Justice of Ontario. 
Armour's death in the summer of 1903 resulted in the appointment 
of Allen B. Aylesworth, a prominent Toronto lawyer. The 
Canadians clearly appointed less outspoken jurists. However, 
their actions during the Tribunal present evidence that neither 
of the Canadian judges had any likelihood of voting against his 
country.
The Canadians also engaged in political threats. When word 
leaked that the Lord Alverstone might vote for the Americans, 
Prime Minister Laurier declared, "(i]f we are thrown over by 
[the] Chief Justice, he will give the last blow to British 
Diplomacy in Canada. He should be plainly told this."57 This 
quasi-threat of Canadian independence reflects the Canadian
d The title of Viscount (Baron) Alverstone was bestowed on 
Richard Evarard Webster in 1900.
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situation. The Canadians, aware of Roosevelt's threats, 
responded with pressure and diplomatic threats of their own.
The Canadian claims were questionable from the beginning. 
The Canadian prospects:
were never good because the Canadian and imperial 
governments, faced with the terms of the Anglo-Russian 
treaty of 1825, which were vague and bore little 
relation to the terrain to which they were to apply, 
had done practically nothing between 1870 and 1896 to 
prepare a case and prevent claims from being 
solidified by a quarter of a century of tacit 
acquiescence by Canada.58
Also,
The Canadian case was weak in that for seventy years 
the assumption of Russia and the United States that 
the lisiere was unbroken had gone virtually 
unchallenged, and British maps as well as Russian and 
American had shown the boundary running around the 
heads of the inlets.59
In addition to the lack of activity and maps, Canada "made claims 
so extensive that it had overreached itself in terms of a 
settlement by arbitration or by judicial process."00 
Instead of solidifying the claims in which they did have, Canada 
expanded its claims. As the claims got greater and greater, it 
was easier to lump them all together into one "ridiculous and 
preposterous claim, just as weak as it could be."61
John Foster, in an article for National Geographic, pointed 
out the historical view England had taken on such matters in 
international law. He quoted the Duke of Wellington, who wrote 
in 1822:
Enlightened statesmen and jurists have long held as 
insignificant all titles of territory that are not
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founded on actual occupation, and that title is, in 
the opinion of the most esteemed writers on public 
law, to be established by practical use.62
Russia had established possession and sold it to the United
States. While Great Britain and Canada watched, the United
States had further developed the area. Finally it was time for
the presentation of the cases.
The arguments of the case would be overshadowed by
Roosevelt's actions. Roosevelt's actions strengthened the
Canadian hostility towards the United States. Canada was quick
to interpret any actions as hostile. Unfortunately, Roosevelt's
actions provided all the evidence Canada needed to justify its
fear of American power.
THE AWARD
The award of the Tribunal, settling the Alaskan boundary 
dispute, was based upon the answering of seven questions. The 
decision was not fully in favor of either party, but instead a 
based on a combination of arguments used by both sides. The 
outcome generally favored the existing line held by the United 
States.
The Convention of 1903 or Hay-Herbert Treaty established a 
even-numbered tribunal. The Tribunal had the responsibility of 
answering the following seven questions regarding the Alaska 
boundary:
1. What is intended as the point of commencement of the 
line?
2. What channel is the Portland Channel?
3. What course should the line take from the point of 
commencement to the entrance to Portland Channel?
4. To what point on the 56th parallel is the line to be 
drawn from the head of the Portland Channel, and what 
course should it follow between these points? 5*
5. In extending the line of demarcation northward from the 
said point on the parallel of the 56th degree of North 
latitude, following the crest of the mountains situated
parallel to the coast until its intersection with the 
141st degree of longitude west of Greenwich, subject to 
the marine leagues from the ocean then the boundary 
between the British and Russian territory should be 
formed by a line parallel co the sinuosities of the 
coast and distant therefrom < t more than ten marine
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leagues, was it the intention and meaning of said 
convention of 1825 that there should remain in the 
exclusive possession of Russia a continuous fringe or 
strip of coast on the mainland, not exceeding ten marine 
leagues in width, separating British Fossessions from 
bays, ports, inlets, havens, and waters of the ocean, 
and extending from the said point on the 56th degree of 
latitude north to a point where such line of demarcation 
should intersect the 141st degree of longitude west of 
the Meridian of Greenwich?
6. If the foregoing question should be answered in the 
negative, and in the event a summit of such mountains 
proving to be in places more than ten marine leagues 
from the coast, should the width of the lisiere which 
was to belong to Russia be measured (1) from the 
mainland coast of the ocean, strictly so-called, along a 
line perpendicular thereto, or (2) was it the intention 
and meaning of the said convention that where the 
mainland coast is indented by deep inlets, forming part 
of the territorial waters of Russia, the width of the 
lisiere was to be measured (a) from the line of the 
general direction of the mainland coast, or (b) from the 
line separating the waters of the ocean from the 
territorial waters of Russia, or (c) from the heads of 
the aforesaid inlets? 7
7. What, if any exist, are the mountains referred to as 
situated parallel to the coast, which mountains, when 
within ten marine leagues from the coast, are declared 
to form the eastern boundary?1
These seven questions were to be argued and presented to the 
tribunal, which would make the decision which "shall be final and 
binding upon all parties...."2
After ratification, the treaty allowed for a maximum of two 
months for each government to gather evidence and then exchange 
the evidence gathered. After exchanging evidence, the treaty 
allowed two months for each party to exchange counter-cases. 
However, a stipulation was added that "the tribunal may" extend
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that period for the explicit purpose of procuring "additional 
papers and evidence."3
The British government made a request for a two-month 
extension with a letter dated May 15, 1903, which Secretary Hay 
received May 25.4 Great Britain requested, on June 12, a list of 
originals "which embraced practically all" of the United States 
documents. Secretary Hay denied the British request but gave 
Britain the opportunity to verify that the United States had the 
original copy of all the requested documents. Great Britain was 
forced to comply with the treaty and the counter cases were 
exchanged July 3, 1903.5 However on August 10, another 
application essentially the same as previous request was made by 
Great Britain. The United States replied that the documents were 
enroute to London for the actual Tribunal and granted the British 
government an inspection of the documents on August 31. However, 
no inspection of the documents ever took place.6 It would seem 
the request was only made to buy time.
Great Britain was not the only side with complaints. 
Ambassador Joseph Choate was helping J. W. Foster prepare the 
American case. Choate was being denied access to the "rich store 
of papers in the Public Record Office bearing on the Alaska. 
Question."7 However, each party dealt with the situation and 
prepared their cases for the first meeting of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal's first meeting occurred at the reception room 
of the British Foreign Office on September 3, 1903. The printed
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arguments of each country's counsels were presented at this first 
meeting. Elihu Root moved that Lord Alverstone should be 
President of the Tribunal. The motion carried unanimously. The 
Tribunal decided that the presentations would alternate from 
Great Britain to the United States with each counsel. The 
Tribunal also opened the argument sessions to the public. The 
Tribunal then recessed until September 15, 1903.
The Tribunal reconvened on September 15. Sir Robert B. 
Finaly3 began the British case at 11am. Each session lasted from 
11am to 4pm with a break at 1:30pm for lunch. Finaly's arguments 
lasted for six and a half sessions. Upon the conclusion of 
Finaly's arguments, David Watsonb argued for the United States 
for three sessions. Arguments continued with Christopher 
Robinson0 presenting for two sessions for Canada, followed by 
Hannis Taylord for the United States for one session. Sir Edward 
Carson0 then took up the British argument for one and a half - 
sessions. Jacob M. Dickersonf for the United States ended with 
three days of arguments. At the end of the eighteen days of oral 
arguments, the Tribunal went into private deliberations on 
October 8, 1903. *9
3 Sir Robert Finlay, was the Attorney-General of England 
b David T. Watson was an anti-trust lawyer. 
c Christopher Robinson was a Canadian lawyer. 
d Hannis Taylor was an expert in international law.
9 Sir Edward Carson was the Solicitor-General of England.
£ Jacob M. Dickinson had been a former Assistant Attorney General of the 
United States.
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The governments took different, approaches to arguing their 
case. The British argued that a new interpretation of the 
meaning of the words in the Treaty of 1825 was needed. The 
United States, on the other hand, argued that previous actions of 
each country had provided an interpretation. In the most basic 
terms, "Essentially, the British case was based on hermeneutics, 
and the United States case on history."8 Arguments in favor of 
each interpretation were laid down in the written cases and 
counter cases.
The Tribunal received these written arguments and heard 
oral arguments. The basic function of the oral arguments was 
"more truly one of clarification than actual persuasion." The 
information from the oral arguments was used in closed sessions 
to actually decide the case.9 In order for the Tribunal to be as 
informed and clear as possible, questions from the jurists were 
allowed. During the oral arguments the chief questions from the 
jurists came from Aylesworth and Turner.10
The United States relied on maps as a major source cf 
evidence. It argued that the maps had consistently interpreted 
the boundary to run outside of the inlets and through Observatory 
Inlet. As proof, the United States submitted many maps including 
a "Russian atlas, published in 1849, [which] places the boundary 
in Portland Canal, which it reaches by going east to Observatory 
Inlet and then North."11 However, the maps available to 
negotiators varied considerably and "[t]he variation among these
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maps reduced their value greatly as proof."12 The United States 
continued to argue the boundary running around the heads of the 
inlets as being customary. When Canadians supplied evidence to 
the contrary, the United States effectively argued "that 
'customarily' did not mean 'invariably' and that custom seemed to 
favor their position."13
Overall, the oral arguments were discussed in a friendly 
manner. John W. Foster in closing his arguments, remarked that 
"during our prolonged sessions not a harsh word has been spoken, 
nor an unpleasant incident occurred to mar the harmony of our 
intercourse."14 He reported that it was "pleasing to state" the 
United States agents were recipients of "marked courtesy and 
consideration" from “he British agents.i5 However, there was 
still apprehension in Canadian circles. During the Tribunal, 
Canadians maintained a bleak outlook on the Alaskan boundary 
award. On Saturday September 17, 1903, the Manitoba Free Press 
reported " [tjhere is an increasing amount of pessimism in 
Canadian circles in London."16 This pessimism spread to Canada, as 
Canadians waited for the award.
At noon on October 20, 1903, the final decision of the 
Tribunal was deli'/ered. The decision consisted of an award and 
five maps describing the boundary line.9 The whole Tribunal 
process had taken place in less then eight months. John W.
Foster observed that "such a prompt result is almost without
9 The boundary line can be see on Map 5 on the next page.
Illustration 5: The Tribunal's Award
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parallel in the intercourse of nations."17 The Tribunal 
unanimously agreed on Cape Muzon as the point of commencement.
The Tribunal also unanimously agreed that the boundary ran to the 
north of Wales and Pearse Islands. A majority of the Tribunal 
agreed that the boundary line ran south of Sitkian Island and 
Kannaghunut Island. A majority also agreed that the line should 
extend around the heads of the inlets and follow the mountains' 
summit line marked on the maps issued with the award. This 
mountain line reached inland and did not follow the mountains 
arising directly from the coast. The mountain line also left a 
large gap were "the evidence is not sufficient to enable the 
Tribunal to say which are the mountains parallel to the coast 
within the meaning of the Treaty/'18 An in-depth look at all the 
questions will help to set the stage for the Canadian reaction to 
the award.
Question one concerned the eastern and southern starting 
point of the boundary. Cape Muzon was chosen as the starting 
point. Cape Muzon (located on 54 39' 38'' according to the 
American survey and 54 39' 50'' according to the British) is 
actually not the southern tip of Prince of Wales Island (as the 
1825 Treaty required). It is the southern tip of Dali Island.
The Tribunal ruled that the signers of the 1825 Treaty had 
believed Dali Island to be a promontory of Prince of Wales 
Island. Therefore it was the intert of the signers that the 
boundary line commence at Cape Muzon.19
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Question two asked which channel was the Portland Channel. 
The channel dispute affected the ownership of Kannaghunut, 
Sitklan, Wales and Pearse islands found in-between the Pearse 
Canal (the Canadian claim) and Observatory Inlet (the American 
claim).h Secretary Hay maintained that the southern boundary 
question "was not wholly in favor of either party."20 Compared 
with the other questions the Portland Channel question was of 
little concern going into the tribunal. While both countries 
argued their case, "neither nation contested strongly for their 
possession.1,21
In reality both countries agreed on what channel was the 
Portland Channel, it was Portland Canal. However, Portland Canal 
ended just north of the 55° latitude. From that point, two 
channels flowed to the Pacific. One was the Pearse Canal the 
other Observatory Inlet. In support of the their views, the 
British agents relied on Captain George Vancouver's narrative.22 
The United States argued that there was a distinction between 
Vancouver's Portland Canal and the one referred to by the 
negotiators of 1825. They also maintained the negotiators did 
not have Vancouver's narratives.23
George Davidson* 1 explained the American view in 1903, which 
was that the Portland Canal was
a three mile wide opening with bold approaches and
deep water, and not an obscure strait like Pearse
h See the map on the following page.
1 George Davidson was the President of the Geographical Society of the 
Pacific.
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Illustration 6: Portland Channel Line
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Inlet of today, which is hidden by a number of islands 
north of Point Wales and was condemned by Vancouver.24
According to Vancouver's narrative, Mr. Brown (his
companion) exploring the area, found "[t]he principal
circumstance was that of his having sailed up a large opening,
whose southern entrance was in latitude 54° 4 5' ,"25 "Mr. Brown
found it extend[ed] to north-westward, with several arms
branching from it in various directions to the latitude of 56°
20' .',26 Vancouver's narrative continues to say, "the entrance of
which he had visited, and found it spacious and large, but had
not penetrated any distance into it."27 No mention of the smaller
Sitkian and Kannaghunut Islands was made in the correspondence of
the negotiators or in Vancouver's narratives.28
The decision to divide the four islands, which were claimed
by both sides, brought about the most controversy. Neither
country had argued for splitting the islands, so when the
Tribunal awarded Sitkian and Kannaghunut to the United States and
Wales and Pearse to Caxiada, suspicion of a compromise was
rampant. Canadians were the most upset.
The idea of splitting ownership of the islands first
occurred during the oral arguments. On September 16, 1903,
during the third day of the Tribunal, Turner questioned Finlay
about the possibility that Tongass passage could be interpreted
as the mouth of Pearse Channel.29 Finlay responded that this
might have been possible but he thought it unlikely.30
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Lodge wrote Roosevelt as early as September 24, 1903, 
saying "that we could afford, with a slight modification, to 
accept their Portland Channel." This slight modification would 
appear to be the splitting of the islands. It would appear the 
American commissioners, if not the American counsels, were 
prepared to split the four islands.31
On October 12, two American commissioners first raised and 
"argued at length" the possibility of splitting the islands.32 
During this discussion, no mention of the value of the smaller 
islands was made.
George Turner was the creator of the split island decision. 
Once it appeared that the Tribunal would not award all four 
Islands to the United States, Turner made a very careful study of 
Vancouver's narrative. He argued that Vancouver had thought 
Tongas Passage was the natural outlet of Portland Channel. He 
pointed out that Vancouver made no mention of Kannaqhunut and 
Sitkian Islands.3- Therefore, it would be reasonable that if the 
negotiators of the Treaty had considered Pearse Canal to be 
Portland Canal they would have also thought that Pearse Canal 
flowed through the larger Tongass passage instead of the small 
passage in-between Kanaghunut Island and the mainland.
On October 17 a vote was taken which split the islands.34 
On the October 19, Jette and Aylesworth had a private conference 
with Lord Alverstone. In this conference the Canadians claimed 
the two small islands were important strategic islands. Lord
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Alverstone responded by telling the Canadians to bring it up 
before the Tribunal.35 However, neither Jette or Aylesworth ever 
brought up the strategic value of the islands before the 
Tribunal. The final award delivered to the public on October 20 
proclaimed the "Tribunal unanimously agrees... [the boundary line] 
passes to the north of Pearse and Wales island" and "majority of 
the Tribunal" agrees it then flows through "the channel between 
Wales and Sitklan Island called Tongass Channel."36
On the return of the American commissioners to the United 
States, President Roosevelt remarked that those two islands 
should be called "Turner's Twins."37 However far from helping the 
United States by saving two American islands, this decision would 
hurt the United States by leaving lasting Canadian bitterness. 
Roosevelt was prepared to use those little islands "as a make 
weight" or arbitrate them "before the Hague by preference."38 The 
decision was seen by the Canadians as a compromise which may have 
been of "slight importance had it not been for its psychological 
effect."39 This psychological effect will be discussed in the 
section dealing with Canada's reaction to the award.
Question four of the treaty dealt with the course the 
boundary line should follow in the fifteen-mile gap between the 
Portland Canal and the 56th parallel. The Canadians maintained 
that the line should meet up with their mountain line. The 
Americans believed it should be a straight line from the Portland
Channel. In this regard the American claim was "tactically much
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stronger on this issue."40 In the end the Americans and 
A1vers tone voted on the spot marked "D" on the map, which 
followed the general mountain line favoring the Americans.41 The 
chosen spot resembled more closely the American position.
Question five asked, "was it the intention and meaning... (of 
the 1825 Treaty) that there should remain in the exclusive 
possession of Russia a continuous fringe or strip of coast on the 
mainland? This was the crucial question for the Tribunal. It 
would decide if Canada would get the harbor it desperately wanted 
on the Alaskan Panhandle.
The arguments concerning question five revolved around the 
meaning of sinuosities of the coast as used in the 1825 Treaty. 
The Canadians maintained the sinuosities of the coast referred to 
the break from the ocean, cutting off inlets less then six miles 
wide. This would leave the heads of inlets such as Lynn in 
Canadian possession. The Americans claimed that the sinuosities 
of the coast moved in and out along the inlets, otherwise why 
include the word "sinuosities."
Alverstone agreed with the American interpretation. He 
recorded his decision that the boundary "was to run round the 
heads of the inlets, and not to cross them."42 With Alverstone, 
the Americans answered question five in the affirmative. The 
American definition was accepted.
Aylesworth and Jette dissented. One reason for 
Aylesworth's rejection was based on the points of the surveys of
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1892. Aylesworth’s judgement seems to be flawed as he argued 
these surveys as evidence for the coast starting at the mouths of 
the inlets. He thought this established the Canadian contention 
that the boundary line started from the heads of the inlets. In 
reality the surveys were conducted from the rivers mouths at the 
inlets' ends not from the heads of the inlets.43 The actual 
survey locations supported the American contention that the ocean 
coast included the inlets.
Question six dealt with the question of where the ten- 
league line should commence if there was no continuous strip. 
Since question five was answered in the affirmative, no decision 
was required for question six.
Question seven asked, which, if any, mountains were 
intended to form the boundary. The difficult question for the 
Tribunal was where in the sea of mountains that made up the 
Alaskan Panhandle was the summit line parallel to the coast? The 
task was even more difficult because, "Neither nation seemed to 
establish its position regarding the mountains."44
The Americans claimed that the mountain chain the 
negotiators of the 1825 Treaty intended to use as the boundary 
did not exist. The most important piece of American evidence 
regarding the claim was Vancouver's map.J According to
3 The United States argued the negotiators of the Treaty of 18'.5, did 
have before them a copy of Vancouver's charts, but denied that those 
negotiators had Vancouver's narratives.
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Vancouver's map, there was a summit chain of mountains running
inland around the inlets. It was clear Vancouver:
evidently intended to convey the information that 
behind the continental shore there was a range, or 
ranges, of mountains at distances obtained by 
estimation, because he could not determine them with 
the means he had, nor were their distances necessary 
for his work.45
Because Vancouver estimated the distances, his chart showed a 
distinct mountain chain. It was this range that the United 
States argued was the intention of the 1825 Treaty to make the 
boundary. In actuality, these mountains did not form a chain, 
therefore the boundary should revert to the stipulated ten-league 
distance from the coast.
The Canadians argued that the area was full of mountains, 
which it was, and that the mountains closest to the coast should 
be chosen. The Canadians claimed that parallel to the coast, 
actually meant closest to the coast. If not, then why describe 
them as parallel to the coast and not the second mountain chain 
running parallel to the mountains on the coast? The Canadians 
created a mountain line by linking mountain peaks close to the 
coast. The Canadian mountain line "consisted of some sixty peaks 
which formed no crest or range."46 The Canadians' mountain line 
also crossed inlets, "an unusual attribute for a mountain 
crest. "47
In the end, a majority of the Tribunal decided that "the 
mountains marked S" on their award map were the mountains 
intended by the 1825 Treaty. These mountains ran behind the
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heads of the inlets and were roughly 20 miles from the coast.
They certainly were not the mountains nearest the coast. The 
mountains selected did leave a large gap where "in the absence of 
further survey the evidence was not sufficient" to decide which 
mountains were intended.48 In the gap, the International Boundary 
Commission later defined the boundary. 0. H. Tittman was the 
United States appointee, while the Canadians appointed W. F.
King.49
The Canadian commissioners objected to the mountain line 
awarded. However, their "opinions manifested the same apparent 
weakness as has already been illustrated that the British view 
contained."50 Since Canada's mountain chain went through inlets, 
"the majority fulfilled the requirements of the treaty in a 
better fashion than either of the alternative lines.51 Yet, on a 
coast where "[i]n reality it was practically impossible to select 
a real range of mountains" it was interesting that neither the 
Americans nor Alverstone wrote a reason for the selection of 
their mountains.52 This was especially troubling since their 
interpretation "represented a significant departure from the 
lines advocated by either of the disputants."53
The decision of the tribunal provided an award according to 
the treaty. The award tended to follow arguments of both cases 
instead of clearly aligning with one country's claims. Because 
of this, Canadians viewed the decision as a compromise.
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Canadians believed this compromise resulted from political 
pressure by the United States.
THE REACTIONS
The most prominent aspect of the Alaskan boundary dispute 
was not so much the final award but the reaction to the award.
The award was generally accepted in the United States and 
received little attention in Great Britain. The lasting reaction 
of Canada provided a large amount of the historical importance 
for the Alaskan boundary dispute. This reaction consisted of 
outrage towards Lord Alverstone and the Tongass Passage decision.
The final award of the Alaskan boundary tribunal favored 
the United States' claims. The Canadians were cut off from any 
deep harbor ports via the Alaskan panhandle. The most curious 
aspect of the Tribunal's award was the decision to declare that 
the southern boundary ran through the Tongass Pass. The product 
of the Tongass Pass decision was that two of the four islands in 
question would be given to the United States while the remaining 
two would be given to Canada. The Canadian outcry was enormous 
against what they perceived as a diplomatic rather than judicial 
interpretation of the boundary. In the words of John Hay, it 
gave Canada:
those two little Islands—worth nothing to us. That is 
all poor Canada gets by the decision, and I do not 
wonder they are furious but as Will Thomson used to 
say ‘Serves'erc right, if they can't take a joke.1
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It was the joke that infuriated Canada, not the award. The 
Canadians were frustrated by the way the decision was reached. 
From early on, one observer had noted, "the people of Canada will 
be satisfied if it is made clear that there has been no truckling 
to the United States."2 However, appeasement of the United 
States was exactly the result Canada saw in the award, especially 
in respect to Tongass Pass. They felt the award reflected 
political and diplomatic power relationships.
The Canadian commissioners further roused Canadian 
resentfulness by refusing to sign the award. In the opinion of 
the Canadian jurist L. A. Jette, "I found it impossible, under 
such circumstances, to concur" with the decision.3 The other 
Canadian jurist, A. B. Aylesworth stated that he dissented 
altogether with the award.'1 The Canadian jurists began to play 
the political instead of judicial game. Instead of signing the 
award and ending the matter, they chose not to concede gracefully 
and refused to sign.
Refusing to sign was a right of the Canadians. They were 
well within their prerogative not to sign the award. However, 
what was not acceptable was their public statement. The Canadian 
commissioners issued a statement that would bias Canadian 
interpretation for years. The Commissioners stated that the 
position of the United States' two little islands "wholly 
destroys the strategic value" of the Canadian islands, contending
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that "they command the entrance to Portland Channel, to 
Observation Inlet, and the ocean passage to Port Simpson."5
Lord Alverstone claimed that no suggestion was ever made in 
regards to the strategic value of the smaller islands.
Aylesworth acknowledged that no mention was made of the islands' 
value.6 However, Aylesworth stated he had not mentioned their 
value because he had not wanted to admit it in front of the 
Americans, whom he regarded as Canada's enemy. The Canadian 
legacy of fearing the United States seemed to have engrossed 
Aylesworth. While, thf. American jurists may have seemed less 
than qualified in Canadian minds, they were hardly enemies of 
Canada. Aylesworth's animosity towards the American members 
brings into question selection as an impartial jurist.
As for the significance of the islands, the Canadians 
claimed that they controlled the entrance to Port Simpson. Great 
importance was placed on Port Simpson since 1885. The 
construction of a railroad from Churchill (on Hudson's Bay) to 
Port Simpson was under consideration. The line was the shortest 
route across Canada. The railroad offered the hope that the line 
"must one day become a great highway of commerce for trans­
pacific trade."7 However, the dreams for Port Simpson were never 
fully realized. In regards to the strategic value of the 
American islands. Lord Minto stated "no one considering the 
matter in its military aspect could possible accept such an
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opinion, in fact it was an absolutely misleading statement of the 
case.... "8
The Tongass Passage decision was not just about the value 
of the two islands awarded to the United States. The chief loss 
for the Canadians was not strategic or economic but "the patently 
non-judicial character of that decision."9 The Canadian 
commissioners saw the main reason for this decision as Lord 
Alverstone compromising with the Americans. The Commissioners' 
statement accused Alverstone of making a diplomatic rather than a 
judicial decision,
Alverstone was outraged at the personal attack aimed at
him. He would write in his autobiography that:
The [Alaskan! papers were very voluminous, and after 
studying them carefully and hearing all the arguments,
I came to the conclusion that I could not support the 
main contention of Canada as regarded the boundary, 
and acting purely in a judicial capacity, I was under 
the painful necessity of differing from my two 
Canadian colleagues.10
However, as for the personal attack, Lord Alverstone promptly 
responded, in private, to Aylesworth. He declared Aylesworth's 
claims were unjust and should have been made to him and not to 
the London Times.11 Aylesworth responded that the statement to 
the Times was not a "hasty or inconsiderate action" but instead 
"an explanation to the people of Canada, of this most lamentable 
business."12
When word of the Canadian Commissioners' statement 
concerning their refusal to sign the treaty, reached Canada,
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Lord Lansdowne3 rightly considered any such statement as 
"deplorable." Clifford Sifton, the chief agent on the Canadian 
side, and Lord Minto, Canadian Governor-General both seem to have 
objected to the actions of the Canadian commissioners. Lord 
Minto's conversation with Sifton expressed their shared belief 
that the Aylesworth and Jette did not appreciate "their 
responsibilities as commissioners."13 Alyesworth and Jette seem 
to have overstepped their responsibilities in the Alaskan 
boundary affair.
Prime Minister Laurier had a different reaction. He wrote 
that the concessions of Kannaghunut and Sitklan Islands was "one 
of those concessions which have made British diplomacy odious to 
Canadian people, and it will have most lamentable effect."14
Whether the Canadian commissioners' statement received the 
endorsement of the Canadian government or not, the legacy of the 
Alaska boundary tribunal would be forever influenced by their 
statement. Canadians saw proof of "their worst fear" in the 
award.15 The commissioners claimed the process had not been fair, 
the Canadian people responded with "an explosion of wrath that 
reverberated from one end of the dominion to the other."16
The statement the Canadian commissioners produced effected 
the Canadian public's outlook towards the award. The Winnipeg 
Telegram seems to have seen the deep impact early on when it 
reported:
Lord Lansdowne was the Governor General of Canada.
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It [the statement by the Canadian commissioners] is a 
veritable firebrand thrown into the inflammable 
material of Canadian suspicion of Britain's partiality 
for the good-will of the United States. So serious is 
the act that it is a national and Imperial crime 
unless deliberate injustice was done beyond the shadow 
of a doubt.17
The commissioners' statements certainly promoted a hostile 
environment in Canada. This hostile environment was not 
necessarily a direct result of the tribunal's award, but rather a 
product of the commissioners’ reaction to the award. The Toronto 
Mail and Empire questioned, "Is it possible that this Alaskan 
incident is being used illogically, and as it appears 
untruthfully, with mischievous ends in view?""8 The issue began 
to be used as propaganda for independence and Canadian control of 
its own foreign relations.
Liberal Party Canadian established the Alaskan boundary 
award as a source to promote Canadian control over their foreign 
relations, if not outright independence. As word of the decision 
reached Canada, public opinion reflected Canadian dissatisfaction 
with Great Britain. The Toronto World claimed Canada was 
"Sacrificed on the Altar of Diplomacy to make Britain solid with 
the United States." The Toronto Globe declared, "Canadian 
interests have been sacrificed by Lord Alverstone." The 
Peterborough Times announced that Canadians had been, "Robbed of 
our rights." While the St. John Telegraph explained "Canada was 
tricked in the Alaskan dispute." The Vancouver Province held 
that Canada had been "led like a lamb to the slaughter."19
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Throughout Canada the Alaskan boundary dispute was associated 
with Great Britain's sacrifice of Canadian interests to the 
United >tates. The award became a standard piece of evidence 
when illustrating Great Britain's negligence concerning Canadian 
affairs.
Much of the Canadians' anger focused on Lord Alverstone. 
Alverstone was aware that his "conduct in giving this decision 
was the subject of violent and unjust criticism on the part of 
some Canadians... for a considerable time."20 He claimed that, "I 
think reflection resulted in a fairer judgment."21 He also 
maintained "I only came to this decision with the greatest 
reluctance, and nothing but a sense of my duty to my position 
influenced me."22 However, Alverstone was mistaken in his belief 
that Canada had realized his position. As we will see, the 
history of the Alaskan boundary dispute would focus on his 
''treachery" for decades to come.23
The immediate reaction to the award varied in each country 
involved.. "In the United States it was received with jubilation, 
in Great Britain with relief, and in Canada with indignation."24 
Each country's reaction helped to later define the historiography 
of the dispute.
In Great Britain, the award was seen primarily as promoting 
Anglo-American relations. It was the end of a dispute. The 
British government may not have gotten the result it had most 
hoped for, but the matter was finally solved. As for the
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Canadian claims, the London Times clearly pointed out the British 
feeling that there was a difference "between being driven from 
disputed territory and consenting to abandon a claim to its 
future sovereignty and occupation."25 Great Britain downplayed 
the importance of the territory.
In the United States, the view was that the Alaskan 
boundary was where it should be and was always believed to have 
been. The Americans seemed to gloss over the fact that America 
lost an area roughly the size of Rhode Island in the award.
Teddy Roosevelt called the award, a "the greatest diplomatic 
victory of our times." Roosevelt's statement further inflamed 
the Canadians. And in a historical sense, little note was taken 
of the fact that because of the award, the size of the United 
States actually was reduced. For the general public, ”Canada['s] 
indignation was dismissed as [the] irritation of a poor loser."20 
This reaction was seen in the comics of the day.b
In Canada, the public was outraged, as seen in the 
newspapers. To Canadians, their anger "was not the petulant 
complaint of a poor loser. It was the just anger of the man who 
considered himself the victim of a confidence game."2' This 
outrage fueled the early historical interpretation of the Alaskan 
boundary dispute.
The critical moment in the Alaskan boundary dispute was not 
the actual award, but the public statement by the Canadian
D See next page.
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M o t h e r  E n g l a n d : "Come, Johnny, take your medicine 
like a man; even-body is laughing at you, and S a m m y  is 
"whistling for you to come out and play.”
From the Xcu'$-Tribunc (Duluth).
Illustration 7 . Political Cartoons
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commissioners. The public statement was embraced by factions 
calling for greater Canadian autonomy. These factions connected 
British neglect with the Alaskan award by using the 
Commissioners' statement.
THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL LEGACY
In order to best understand the historiography of the 
Alaskan boundary dispute, a basic understanding of major trends 
in Canadian historiography is needed. The following is intended 
to serve only as a broad generalization; however, it is important 
for the basic understanding it provides United States-Canadian 
relations and specifically the Alaskan boundary dispute.
Early English-Canadian historians focused on the 
constitutional development of Canada. The main focus was that 
through a long slow process Canada had gradually gained freedom 
though responsible government. This Constitutional development 
history centered on Canada's relationship with Britain. It was 
only during the late 1920s that Canadian historians began to 
"explore in detail" Canada's relationship with the United 
States.1
During the 1920's and 1930's, Canada began to recognize the 
United States as "Canada's Friend."2 It was also during this 
time that Canadian Nationalists began "an exaggerated and 
misguided pursuit of 'autonomy.'"3 It is important to understand 
the significance the Alaskan boundary dispute took on in terms of 
Anglo-Canadian relations. The Canadians positioned the dispute
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squarely in favor of increased autonomy. The award was analyzed 
by the effect it had on Canadian-British relations. Scholarship 
focused mainly on the Alverstone's treachery. Only later during 
the 1960s and 1970s would a broad movement push the Alaskan 
boundary dispute into a Canadian-American relationship. The 
focus shifted towards Roosevelt's actions.
John Ewart was the first to publish a major study of the 
Alaskan boundary dispute. He was an Ottawa lawyer and author of 
sixty pamphlets from 1908-1932. Generally, Ewart's works argued 
that "Canada must declare its complete equality with Great 
Britain and remain linked to her only by a common monarch."4 
Ewart was an advocate of "the removal of all symbols of colonial 
status."3 Ewart's studies tended to expose British neglect.
Ewart was especially hard on the Lord Alverstone in 
relation to the Alaskan boundary dispute. His sizable essay on 
the dispute centered around the "treachery of Lord Alverstone."0 
Ewart in his essay on the Alaskan Boundary displayed strong wrath 
even five years after the fact. Ewart was especially severe on 
the Portland Channel decision.
Alverstone had actually drafted an award supporting the 
Canadian contention that all four islands would belong to Canada. 
Ewart received a copy of the first judgement and compared it to 
the second judgment. Ewart claimed "not one of these alterations 
materially supported the conclusion of the second judgment."’ 
Ewart was outraged that "with the change of one word in one
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clause, the omission of two words in another clause; and the 
interjection of one whole clause, this second judgment of Lord 
Alverstone is really his first judgment."8 Ewart offered his 
deductions as proof of a compromise on the question. Ewart 
continued on:
And that which the present writer principally resents 
is not Lord Alverstone's treachery, not even his gift 
of the two islands to the United States, but his 
contemptuous indifference in leaving on record the 
arguments which establish our case and affixing to it 
a decision against us. Does he really imagine that 
among all the 'colonials' there is no one with wit 
enough to detect the imposition, or with courage 
enough to denounce it?9
However, Ewart's resentment seems to be misplaced.
Apparently Ewart was unaware of Turner's arguments. He 
failed to acknowledge that the same judgment was possible, 
judicial, and logical. After all, the second judgment was in 
favor of Pearse Canal just as the first had been. They resembled 
each other precisely because the judgments resembled each other. 
The only difference dealt with the question of where the Pearse 
Canal emptied into the ocean, which had not been covered in the 
original judgment. Alverstone had not been aware that there was 
a question over that issue when he wrote his first judgment. 
However, in defense of Ewart, it is easy to jump to his 
conclusion without any knowledge of Turner's argumentation. If 
one reads only the oral arguments and the two verdicts, it would 
be natural to assume a diplomatic compromise occurred instead of 
a judicial judgment. But the fact remains, that if Turner's
10 9
arguments are taken into account, as they should be, it is 
perfectly logical to judicially decide that the larger Tongass 
Passage is the natural path of both the Pearse and Portland 
Channels.
Ewart based much of the rest of his essay around
Alverstone's decision in relation to the Portland Channel. On
the other questions Ewart claims:
if in discussion [of] the second and third [questions] 
we find good reason to doubt his good faith, if we 
find conclusive evidence that his decision of one or 
both of them was dishonest, then we shall not be able 
to suppress the belief that all his decisions were of 
the same character.10
Apparently Ewart had enough faith in his first judgment to take 
this broad leap.
Ewart's arguments became a standard in the historiography 
of the Alaskan boundary dispute. Quotes from his essay are 
common even in recent writings. Ewart's arguments can also be 
seen later histories of the Alaskan boundary dispute. Ewart's 
work had a lasting legacy especially among Canadians supporting 
greater autonomy.
O. D. Skelton, like Ewart, thought Canada should "assume 
full sovereignty in isolation from the Empire."11 Skelton served 
as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1925 until 
1941.12 He was also a writer and historian.
Skelton's writings were shaped by his "great distrust of 
British motives."13 Skelton's major work was his official
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biography of Wilfrid Laurier in 1922, a work that was generally 
well received.
Skelton followed Ewart's interpretation of Alverstone's 
Portland channel decision, calling it "a classic work of legal 
reconstruction."14 Skelton continued the view that Alverstone had 
made a diplomatic decision, which should have been left to 
negotiators not a judge. However, Skelton downplayed the real 
importance of the area, again focusing on the lack of effective 
British control of Canadian foreign relations and Roosevelt's 
imprudent actions.
A leading Canadian historian, Adam Shortt, reviewed 
Skelton's work. He claimed that Skelton's section dealing with 
the Alaskan boundary dispute was "not so happy as most other 
sections of the work, either in the presentation of facts or in 
the spirit in which they are treated."15
The next major writer to tackle the dispute was John W. 
Dafoe. Dafoe had long been the editor of the Winnipeg Free 
Press, and a friend of its owner Clifford Sifton. Dafoe 
maintained that he was "the correspondent to whom he [Sifton] 
wrote with the greatest frankness about political matters."16 
With his close relation to Sifton, Dafoe wrote a biography of 
Clifford Sifton in 1931.
Dafoe's work devoted considerable attention to the Alaskan 
Boundary dispute. Dafoe continued the argument that Alverstone 
had made a diplomatic decision, but shifted much of the blame to
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the Americans. Dafoe maintained Lord Alverstone was bullied into
making a diplomatic decision by the Americans. He also claimed
the award was "a loss to both sides to the controversy."17
The most extensive look into the Alaskan boundary look came
from Fredrick W. Gibson in 1944. Gibson wrote the 450 page long
"The Alaskan Boundary Dispute," as his master's thesis.3
Gibson argued that the Canadians had a different definition
of "judicial" than did Lord Alverstone. To the Canadians
judicial related to the direct interpretation of the law as
embodied in the Treaty of 1825. Lord Alverstone, however, used
"judicial" in a broader way that required consideration of value
and importance to negotiating parties.18 According to Gibson,
this discrepancy in the meaning of judicial played a major role
in shaping the Canadian view of the award. The result of the
attack on the non-judicial decision of the award "confirmed
Canadians in the assumption that their country's case possessed
legal merit greater than it actually did."19
However, just because Alverstone had a different view of
judicial does not mean Gibson agreed with the decision. Gibson
claimed the award in respect to Portland Channel "was manifestly
a compromise decision and flagrantly violated the judicial
character of the tribunal." He also attacked Alverstone saying,
As a mediator, if not as a judge, he blundered 
seriously in failing to enter into close collaboration
3 While Gibson's thesis was never published, it is extremely important 
because later historians such as Norman Penlingtcn and C. P. Stacy 
reference it as an "excellent source."
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with his Canadian colleagues and especially in 
neglecting to inform them privately of his change of 
opinion on the question of Portland Channel.21
While this is a legitimate argument, it does little to explain
the drastic statement issued by the Canadians. Surely, that
statement was further outside the bounds of a judicial settlement
than Alverstone's decision.
The end result for Gibson was "Great Britain advanced one 
step nearer an entente cordiale with the United States, at the 
cost of temporary estrangement of Canada."22 However, he states 
that with the exception of the ratification of the Convention of 
1903, "the record of British conduct of the Alaskan negotiations 
is one of faithful deference to the wishes of the Canadian 
government."23 Gibson fails to effectively explain why if the 
British were faithful to Canadian wishes a temporary estrangement 
with Canada was necessary. The fact remains that a large part of 
the estrangement is due to the statement of the Canadian 
Commissioners.
William Lewis Morton in his 1963 work, The Kingdom of 
Canada; a General History from Earliest Times, maintained 
"nothing did more to sharpen the Canadian sense of nationality 
than the Alaskan boundary dispute and its settlement."24 He 
acknowledged Alverstone's decision on the Islands "brought down 
on himself and the United Kingdom the wrath of an embittered 
Canadian public."23 However, the author goes on to call Canadian 
outrage "an unreasonable reaction."26
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H. George Classen, a Russian immigrant arriving in Canada 
via Argentina, wrote a popular history of the five historic 
United State-Canadian border disputes. His work Thrust and 
Counterthrust, offered considerable insight into the award. 
Classen claired that Alverstone "had rendered a just judgment on 
the land boundary."'J He also maintained that the United States 
had a just case, but would have been better off if it had not 
been so abrasive. The author's main contention was that the 
Canadian claim "was absurd."28 He focused much of the blame on 
Donald Cameron for moving the line so dramatically.
A review of Classen by Normal Penlington claims Classen's 
work suffers from "the frequent American bias of this book."29 He 
explains that "Classen has not much to say about the exercise of 
American power and its ability to take advantage of Britain's 
pre-occupation elsewhere."30 Perhaps most grievous to Penlington 
was Classen's lack of attention to established interpretation. 
Penlington offered Classen the following as advise-"He will find 
that closer attention to the canons and form of historical 
scholarship will often give a book more than a temporary 
reputation."31 Classen's work may have benefited from 
disregarding the cannon.
Norman Penlington, himself offered the next major 
interpretation in The Alaskan Boundary Dispute: A Critical 
Reappraisal, in 1971. in his study, Penlington maintains
Laurier was chiefly responsible for the Alaskan award." 32 The
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reason Laurier is to blame is because he failed to realize the 
power structures at work, Penlington's underlying theme is that 
the United States acted like a bully, and Laurier should have 
realized he was dealing with a bully. He said of President 
Roosevelt, "the ruthlessness of his actions left a heritage of 
Canadian bitterness, which Canadians hid from themselves by 
blaming Britain."33 Penlington claims United States policy and 
pressure from 1898 is known in the academic world but has "never 
been generally accepted by Canadians."34 So Penlington's 
reappraisal can be characterized as a shifting of the blame from 
Britain to Laurier. While some blame is better placed on the 
Americans, why blame the Americans for taking such a hard stance 
when the author admits "the United States had the better claim."35
Another analysis of the dispute was offered by Charles P. 
Stacey, a historian at the University of Toronto. He argued that 
the era of good relations between the Canada and the United 
States was a recent development.
Stacey wrote Age of Conflict volume I 1867-1921 in 1984; 
and maintained that the award was in the end beneficial, for the 
simple fact it ended the issue.36 However, Stacy also continued 
the argument against the diplomatic decision. He claimed, the 
"evidence indicates rather strongly... [that Alverstone] acted the 
part of a politician rather than a judge."37 He also felt the 
dispute had lasting effect due to Roosevelt's packed court and 
unreasonable threats.38 However, Stacey also attacked the
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Canadian actions. According to Stacey, Canadian jurists "seem to 
have been just as much devoted to their own country's case as the 
Americans were to theirs."39 The overall importance of the award 
was again connected to the absence of Canada's control over its 
own foreign relations. Stacey compared the Alaskan Award to the 
Washington Treaty of 1871, emphasizing Canada's lack of 
ratification, and forced acceptance of both.40
Charles Callan Tansill is the major American historian of 
the boundary dispute. Tansill wrote for the Carnegie Endowment 
series. This series was designed to cover several aspects of the 
history of United States-Canadian relations. The series, while 
written by different scholars, generally held that the United 
States-Canadian relationship was "born in the civil war and 
characterized for almost a century afterwards by tension, 
suspicion, and hostility, but gradually issues had been 
peacefully resolved, and arbitrated until unparalleled cordiality 
and friendliness prevailed."41
Tansill's 1943 contribution to the series was Canadian- 
American Relations, 1875-1911. In the introduction Tansill wrote 
of the "inspiration of Dr. James Shottwell, who symbolizes as no 
one else can, the essential unity of Canadian and American 
peoples."42
Tansill compliments the American appointments to the 
Tribunal. He agrees with Henry White's assessment that Lodge 
showed "great tact and considerable diplomacy throughout."43 He
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also claims Senator Turner "was far more competent than is 
usually supposed."44 Tansill is disappointed by the Root, feeling 
he should have played a greater part in the negotiations.45 As 
for the dispute, Tansill points out the apparent lack of faith of 
Laurier. Tansill's analysis of the Award is limited. He saw the 
chief result of the award as creating a New Imperial Order in the 
British Empire.
A. R. M. Lower wrote a review of Tansill's work. In the 
review, Lower praised Tansill's analysis of the Fisheries 
Question, the Pelagic Sealing question, and the Alaskan boundary 
dispute. Lower further claimed Tansill had written "the 
definitive book on these questions.”46 However, he claimed 
Tansill had not fully understood the power relationship. Lower 
claimed "power was perhaps the major factor in the Alaskan 
Boundary dispute."47 Once again a Canadian historian failed to 
examine the historical legacy of the Canadian commissioners. The 
dispute can never be judged on the merits of the case, there must 
be some underlying explanation why Canada's claims failed. The 
lasting bitterness is never seen as a result of the 
Commissioners' statement. Instead the Commissioners' statement 
is seen as proof of foul play.
In the Alaskan boundary dispute, "No party to it acted 
irreproachably and perhaps none with great astuteness."48 
However, the historiography of the dispute reflects only the
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American and British infractions. The trend is to expose 
unfortunate incidents and blow them out of proportion.
The most unfortunate incident concerning the Alaskan 
boundary dispute is that the bitterness lasted so long. In 
reality "Canada lost nothing of great value and the United States 
gained nothing of great value."49 When the award came in 1903, 
"Dyea was already dead and Skagway dying."33 In actuality, what 
the award gave the United States was land "barring the way to 
decaying mines in an undeveloped wilderness."51
This wilderness on the edge of the world was not vast.
Canada lost its claim to territory "probably half as large as 
Scotland" while the United States lost an area roughly the size 
of Rhode Island.52
As for any legal precedent, the Alaska boundary dispute did 
little to establish any constructive precedent in boundary 
settlements. The greatest benefit in this regard, "is that an 
experiment was made on material which did not matter very much 
and that useful experience was gained by trial and error."53
The boundary dispute had little actual effect on later 
events. While its "lingering bitterness... paved the way for an 
explosion of Canadian nationalism in 1911."54 The most direct 
effect was that it was "responsible for much ill feeling in 
Canada, and for the failure in all probability of the Reciprocity 
Treaty eight years later."55
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The British author Harry Cranbrook Allen tried to promote 
the main theme "Canada had no alternative but to accept the 
ironical axiom of her political existence, that though she might 
pay the highest price for Anglo-American friendship, she was also 
its greatest beneficiary."56 It seems that close to one-hundred 
years later, Canadians are still more concerned with relative 
power and possible infractions than accepting any possible 
benefits that could have been received from the Hay-Herbert 
Trea* • 'T the Award.
The Hay-Herbert treaty established an agreeable settlement, 
but nada's major benefit of forcing the United States to 
arbit. :e and finding a face-saving way out of its extravagant 
claims was destroyed by Theodore Roosevelt's appointments and 
threats. These actions led to the Canadian refusal to sign the 
award, which promoted the view of Great Britain selling out 
Canadian interests to the United States. The result of this view 
allowed Canadians to convert the Alaskan boundary dispute into a 
political fight with Great Britain.
The Alaskan boundary dispute's connection with the right to 
self-control of foreign relations and possible independence, 
became a focal point in Canadian history. Canadians became the 
prime historical writers on the Alaskan boundary award, because 
of the greater impact the award had on Canadian history. Instead 
of creating a critical interpretation of the Hay-Herbert treaty, 
which can only be achieved by looking at both the treaty benefits
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at the time of negotiation and then the results of the treaty, 
the Canadian research focused on Lord Alverstone's perceived 
betrayal of Canadian interests and Theodore Roosevelt's actions. 
Meanwhile the relative historical insignificance of the Alaska 
boundary dispute upon American and British history provided 
little counter-interpretation. Therefore, the lasting legacy of 
the Alaskan boundary dispute was Canadian bitterness towards 
Great Britain and the United States.
It should be said that the Hay-Herbert treaty provided 
Canada a chance to erase years of anti-Americanism and ill will 
towards Great Britain by allowing Canada to force America to 
answer Canadian claims. Roosevelt's actions were disruptive to 
the award, which in the eyes of Canadians allowed the United 
States to avoid accountability. Canada reacted to the award with 
widespread outrage, which attributed to the misinterpretation of 
the Alaskan boundary dispute. The overshadowing of the Hay- 
Herbert treaty, in favor of the overemphasis of the award, 
resulted in the use of the Alaskan boundary dispute as Canadian 
evidence for justifying their fear of American jingoism and 
supporting their belief in British disloyalty. In truth however, 
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